Civil Liberty in America: The Diffusion of Municipal Bill of Rights Resolutions after the Passage of the USA PATRIOT Act¹

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In the years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some 400 local governments passed “Bill of Rights” resolutions in opposition to the USA PATRIOT Act. Event history analyses show that cities with progressive profiles were markedly quicker to pass such resolutions. These effects are strongest in the early phase of the Bill of Rights campaign, a period for which there is also robust evidence of contagious influence among nearby cities. The authors argue that the campaign’s success lies in the miscibility of multiple movements—the ability of groups with different beliefs, agendas, and traditions to combine around a common goal. The case is used to distinguish between strong and weak forms of miscibility and to develop insight into strategic, organizational, and political conditions that promote the construction of movement-spanning coalitions.

Conflict over the scope of individual rights is fundamental to democratic politics, most sharply when the nation is threatened. While freedoms of speech, assembly, due process, and other constitutional rights receive nearly unanimous assent in the abstract (McClosky and Brill 1983), concrete liberties are politically negotiated. National crises restructure the balance between individual rights and collective security, leading the state to withdraw freedoms that in other times appear inviolable. Civil liberties

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do not go undefended, however; even when confronted by real as well as imaginary enemies, many oppose what they see as the unneeded and unprincipled surrender of rights for security.

This is a recurring issue in American history, as elsewhere. The term “civil liberties” was devised in response to the Espionage and Sedition Acts of 1918, which made it illegal to defame the government. Fears of invasion led to the incarceration of 120,000 Japanese Americans during World War II. At the height of the Cold War’s Red Scare, Congress barred Communists from public employment and outlawed the Communist Party; over 11,000 lost their jobs because of government and private loyalty programs.

In the wake of al Qaeda’s terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, efforts to secure the newly minted American homeland verged into the same territory. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Immigration and Naturalization Service took some 1,200 (largely Muslim and/or Arab) noncitizens residing in the United States into custody, many without charge, amid rampant reports of abuse (Human Rights Watch 2002). The U.S. Department of Justice declared the Geneva Convention void with respect to “enemy combatants,” hundreds of whom have been held incommunicado at Guantanamo Bay pending the successful resolution of the “war on terror.” The USA PATRIOT Act (henceforth Patriot Act) granted the state broad new powers to investigate and hold suspected terrorists. At the time of writing, revelations of the scope of illegal wiretapping and other forms of surveillance continue to appear.

This article studies efforts to protect civil liberties via the municipal passage of “Bill of Rights” (BOR) resolutions. While they vary in their particulars, these resolutions generally reject provisions of the Patriot Act and associated executive orders, instruct local authorities not to comply with federal regulations that conflict with the Bill of Rights, and request that the federal government inform the municipality about antiterrorism investigations and surveillance carried out within its jurisdiction. Over the four-year period studied here, some 400 cities representing over 80

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1 The first of a number of lawsuits was settled on February 28, 2006, when the federal government agreed to pay $300,000 to Ehab Elmaghraby, a restaurant owner in Times Square who alleged that he was physically abused while held in a federal detention center for over a year.

2 Human rights organizations, including the International Red Cross and Human Rights Watch, reported widespread prisoner abuse at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, U.S.-administered Iraqi prisons, and U.S.-run “black sites” located in a variety of countries around the world.

3 We coin the term “Bill of Rights resolutions” to provide a clear referent for this article’s discussion. While they have no standard name, the resolutions studied here are part of a social movement campaign initiated by the Bill of Rights Defense Committee (BORDC), as discussed below.

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million people adopted BOR resolutions. To our knowledge, this campaign is the broadest grassroots effort to protect civil liberties in the history of the United States.5

What conditions lead citizens to be more likely and able to organize in defense of their legal and political rights? Tocqueville’s seminal Democracy in America ([1835] 2000) provides the classic answer, one that speaks to fundamental issues at the intersection of political sociology and political science. Tocqueville argued that local associations and the mores they engender form a bulwark against the twin perils of tyranny and anarchy. He celebrated the tradition of local self-government: “The institutions of a township are to freedom what primary schools are to science; they put it within reach of the people; they make them taste its peaceful employ and habituate them to making use of it” (p. 57). Participation in political, civic, and religious associations, Tocqueville argued, teaches Americans the virtues of enlightened self-interest, makes them jealous of their rights, and fosters skills and resources that help the people resist the encroachments of centralized power.

Contemporary patterns of civic (dis)engagement raise questions about the continuing utility of Tocqueville’s analysis. Much work suggests that the associational fabric of Schlesinger’s (1944) “nation of joiners” is fraying. Putnam (2000) charts declining rates of involvement in political, civic, and religious associations over the later 20th century (though see Paxton [2002] for a counteranalysis). Skocpol (2003, p. 11) contends that we are living in a “diminished democracy” and a “much less participatory and more oligarchly managed civic world” centered on Washington, D.C. The density of informal ties appears to be on the decline as well; strikingly, the most recent social network component of the General Social Survey indicates that the modal American does not have a single confidant with whom he or she discusses important matters (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears 2006).

High levels of political polarization also undercut efforts to organize on behalf of the rules of the game. The division between Democratic and Republican voting in Congress has risen consistently since the 1970s and is now at a historic high (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Hetherington (2001) demonstrates a resurgence of partisanship linked to sharpened ideological

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5 The BOR campaign has also had the fastest diffusion rate of the welter of progressively oriented municipal campaigns launched in recent years. In a four-year period, 13.3% of cities with populations above 25,000 passed BOR resolutions. By contrast, 8.4% of large towns and cities adopted living-wage resolutions between the early 1990s and 2006, 8% passed climate-change resolutions between 1991 and 2003, and 2.5% adopted “nuclear-free zone” resolutions during the 1980s. See Martin (2001) on the living-wage campaign, Vasi (2007) on climate change, and Bennett (1987) on nuclear-free-zone resolutions.
differences between the two parties. And while the views of the American population as a whole have not polarized, party identifiers are increasingly divided in their social and cultural attitudes as well as their political positions (DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996). All this is bad news for efforts to mobilize around the banner of constitutional rights. If liberals use the Bill of Rights as a weapon against the Bush administration while conservatives side with their president rather than their principles, a civil liberties campaign becomes just another partisan contest unable to gain broad support.

Given declining civic engagement and high levels of political polarization, how can the substantial success of the BOR campaign be understood? We find that the passage of municipal resolutions was promoted by local associations rooted not in the traditional civic culture or mainstream parties but in the social movement community. The leading edge of the campaign was formed by groups concerned with peace, social justice, women’s rights, human rights, and related causes, as well as minor parties located to the left of the Democrats. They were joined by a wide range of allies located across the political spectrum and by religious, professional, and labor associations.

The capacity of groups with different agendas, traditions, and core beliefs to combine is the key dynamic in the BOR campaign and one that we can begin to theorize. In explaining the rapid rise of peace protests in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, Vasi (2006) develops the notion of a “miscible mobilization”: a social movement campaign that draws on a mixture of related causes and established movement organizations to pursue a new goal. We extend Vasi’s analysis to distinguish two qualitatively different forms of miscibility and use the BOR case to explore strategic, organizational, and political conditions that promote the formation of broad-based coalitions.

THE PATRIOT ACT AND BILL OF RIGHTS RESOLUTIONS

The USA PATRIOT Act, a backronym for “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism,” was submitted several days after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Legislation was drafted by the Department of Justice to grant federal agencies broad powers to conduct searches, use electronic surveillance, and detain suspected terrorists. The bill passed the House on October 24, 2001, by a vote of 357 to 66.

Two liquids are termed “miscible” if they dissolve into each other.

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and passed the Senate the next day by a vote of 98 to 1. The Patriot Act was signed into law by President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001.  

President Bush repeatedly praised the Patriot Act, describing it as an “important, good law” that has made America safer because it “closed dangerous gaps in America’s law enforcement and intelligence capabilities, gaps the terrorists exploited when they attacked us on September the 11th.” Others are less sanguine, viewing the act as dangerously encroaching on civil liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. Idaho Republican Congressman C. L. “Butch” Otter, who cast one of the opposing votes, argues:

We celebrate our freedoms and the sacrifices made by those who came before to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.” But are we doing our best to honor those sacrifices if we allow our freedoms to be eroded? Surely the Framers did not intend the Bill of Rights to apply only when it is convenient.

Because of the secrecy surrounding government action, information on the Patriot Act’s impact is not easy to come by. According to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), “The Justice Department’s inspector general reported that 7000 people have complained of abuse and countless others don’t even know that they’ve been subjected to a search because the law requires that they be kept secret.” And while some of the act’s provisions have been declared unconstitutional by lower courts, the larger issue of the state’s powers for the duration of the war on terror remains unresolved.

In late 2001, the idea of municipal BOR resolutions emerged in Northampton, Massachusetts, a community with a rich history of progressive activism and home to Smith College, one of the nation’s most distinguished liberal arts colleges. Nancy Talanian, a longtime activist and


10 “Bush Presses Congress to Renew Patriot Act,” Yahoo! News, June 9, 2005, http://news.yahoo.com/. Citing reasons of national security, the government kept secret its issuance of national security letters (NSLs) until September 28, 2004, when a federal judge struck down the NSL statute and its gag provision. Indeed, until that time the ACLU was prohibited from publicly revealing that it represented individuals served with an NSL.
leading force in the Northampton effort, went on to form the national Bill of Rights Defense Committee (BORDC) in November 2001. Largely a one-woman, one–Web site operation, the BORDC was created with the goal of “helping hundreds of communities across the country participate in an ongoing national debate about civil liberties and antiterrorism legislation that threaten liberties, such as the Patriot Act, Homeland Security Act, and several federal executive orders.” The BORDC Web site provides a record of promulgated resolutions and educational resources concerning the struggle to protect civil liberties.

A variety of associations joined forces with Talanian to promote the BOR campaign. The most important of these is the ACLU, which also played a leading role in challenging the Patriot Act in the courts. As one ACLU staffer told us:

> A lot of people didn’t really know what was going on, because it was so hard to get information. We created the Civil Liberties Task Force and started having meetings on a monthly basis in December 2001. Out of that group came our contribution to building this town resolution movement. What we would do is basically help out by handing materials, sending speakers, and getting our ACLU members in those towns involved.

The idea of municipal BOR resolutions was so timely that four communities (including Ann Arbor, Mich., and Denver, Colo.) enacted them before Northampton did on May 2, 2002. By August 2005, 396 municipal, county, and state resolutions had been promulgated. Of those, we focus on the 138 resolutions that were passed in cities with populations over 25,000. As figure 1 shows, the spread of BOR resolutions follows a sigmoid curve. More than a year passed before the first 20 resolutions were promulgated. Municipal adoption then accelerated, with new resolutions appearing at a rate of almost seven per month between February 2002 and May 2004, before slowing in 2005.

Figure 2 displays the geographic spread of resolutions as of June 2005. The density of adopting cities is greatest in the Northeast and along the Pacific Coast, though in part this reflects overall population densities. The overall hazard of adoption, in fact, is roughly equivalent in the Northeast, the Midwest, and the West, though lower in the South. Both “red” and “blue” states are well represented; only four states are not home to any BOR resolutions.

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PROOF 6
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Political Attitudes and Support for Civil Liberties

A rich vein of survey research probes individual attitudes toward civil liberties. Much of this work follows Stouffer’s (1955) classic *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*, which asked about the concrete rights of threatening groups (“Suppose an admitted Communist wants to make a speech in your community. Should he be allowed to speak, or not?”). Stouffer found that support for the Bill of Rights suffered in translation: majorities would not permit a Communist to speak or hold a job as a university professor or a clerk in a store. Much research in political science (Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964; McClosky and Brill 1983; Gibson 1988; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1993; Sniderman et al. 1996) has replicated and extended Stouffer’s analysis.

The literature identifies three main sources of variation in attitudes toward civil liberties. First, community leaders tend to support civil liberties more than ordinary citizens do (see esp. Stouffer 1955; Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky and Brill 1983). This finding gave rise to what is sometimes dubbed the “elite theory of democracy,” since it can reconcile...
Fig. 2.—Geographical diffusion of Bill of Rights resolutions among U.S. cities with populations greater than 25,000 (large dots) by June 2005
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the apparent robustness of American political principles with shallow popular support. The idea is that politically active citizens gain a better appreciation of the rules of the democratic game by playing it. Because they are highly influential, these elites serve as guardians of essential freedoms and “carriers of the creed.”

Survey research also identifies strong effects of formal schooling and residence in urban areas (see esp. Stouffer 1955; McClosky and Brill 1983). This propensity is interpreted in terms of intellectual flexibility, sophistication, and breadth of experience. McClosky and Brill (1983, p. 416) make the argument forcefully:

Respect for the freedom of others and for their rights to think and act as they choose is also furthered by greater exposure to the media, by residence in a cosmopolitan environment, and by membership in the educated and sophisticated subcultures which are among the major repositories and carriers of the ideals of society. Narrow social and intellectual perspectives, insularity, distance from the cultural mainstreams, ignorance of the varieties of human experience and subcultures, and an incapacity (whether socially or psychologically induced) to identify with people perceived as “different” tend to beget intolerance.

Finally, survey research points to the influence of political ideology and party identification. While Stouffer (1955) found no relationship between membership in the Republican or Democratic parties and support for civil liberties, more recent studies point to strong effects. McClosky and Brill (1983) discovered that self-described liberals in the general population are more supportive of civil liberties than are conservatives, and liberal community leaders are more supportive of civil liberties than their conservative counterparts. Sullivan et al. (1993) showed that liberals are more tolerant of the group they detest most than conservatives are. And Sniderman et al.’s (1996) analysis of Canadian attitudes demonstrated sharp divisions along party lines, both on a left-right axis and in contrasts between major and minor parties.

While the civil liberties literature generally emphasizes the theoretical significance of the elite-mass differential and individual political sophistication, we expect political visions to be central to the BOR campaign. The impact of community leadership, education, and urbanity loom largest when support for civil liberties can be equated with tolerance (terms that both Stouffer and McClosky use synonymously). But debates over the Patriot Act center not on generalized tolerance but on the trade-off

12 Sullivan et al.’s (1993) research strategy was designed to counter a potential source of bias in prior research—the tendency for dissident or threatening groups to be positioned on the left (atheists, Communists) rather than on the right (Nazis, the Ku Klux Klan).
between liberty and security. The issue is one of a “clash of rights,” where competing positions reflect political ideology and party affiliation (see Sniderman et al. [1996] for a vigorous reconceptualization of civil liberties research along these lines).

Differences between liberals and conservatives stem in part from core political values and philosophy. Liberalism’s classical commitment is to the rights of the individual, while conservatism’s is to the protection of the community and the social order. Relative to conservatives, liberals place greater weight on rights of due process and privacy (McClosky and Brill 1983; Sniderman et al. 1996) that are challenged by post-9/11 federal policy. They are less ready to trade rights for security, although, like conservatives, their stance varies with the perceived intensity of threat (Davis and Silver 2004).

Debates over the Patriot Act also revolve around competing definitions of “us” versus “them.” Those on the left are more likely to define legal rights as universal and as inclusive of recent immigrants, resident aliens, and noncitizens. While they support public policies that limit the market, liberals are wary of modes of social control likely to target immigrants and minorities. By contrast, conservatives bound the moral community more tightly and are less concerned about the fate of groups likely to be viewed as security threats in the post-9/11 era.

In the case of the BOR campaign, historically contingent factors reinforce these opposing political visions. One’s willingness to furnish the state with extraordinary “wartime” powers depends on faith that those powers will be used wisely. Since the federal government was largely in the hands of conservative Republicans in the period under study, this confidence should have come easier to conservatives than to liberals. Davis and Silver (2004; personal communication) find that shortly after 9/11, conservatives trusted law enforcement and the federal government more than liberals did and, as a result, were less concerned with protecting civil liberties.

Set in terms of American political parties, we expect a Democratic-Republican differential in support of the BOR campaign, with municipalities that tend to support Democratic candidates more likely to pass resolutions. Support for minor parties should follow the same logic, with the progressive, antiestablishment Green Party linked to an unwillingness to trade civil liberties for putative security and the anti-immigrant, socially conservative Independent Party linked to the opposite position. The Libertarian Party is of particular interest since it combines principled support for individual rights and hostility to government intrusion with a broadly conservative outlook.
Local Associations

Much research finds the mobilization of existing organizations and the “appropriation” of their resources to be central to social movement success (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). For instance, the early civil rights movement drew heavily on the resources provided by black colleges and churches (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). For any given social movement, protest activity, or campaign, the question is not whether preexisting organizations matter (they do) but which organizations matter and in what way.

The elite theory of democracy (McClosky and Brill 1983) referenced above suggests a bold hypothesis: the density of local voluntary associations of all kinds should facilitate the passage of municipal BOR resolutions. If citizens learn the meaning and value of democratic principles through civic engagement, cities with more associations and more involvement should more readily mobilize in response to threats to individual rights. Putnam (2000, pp. 355–57) makes just this argument, pointing to a positive correlation between state-level measures of social capital and an index of tolerance for civil liberties. A vibrant associational sector should lead citizens to be more concerned about their legal and political rights and those of their neighbors and better positioned to mobilize in their defense.

Voluntary associations are more than petri dishes for the growth of social capital, however. They are vehicles for collective action that aggregate member preferences and represent them in organized form in the political arena. As Tocqueville (2000, p. 199) argues:

> When an opinion is represented by an association, it is obliged to take a clearer and more precise form. It counts its partisans and implicates them in its cause. The latter teach themselves to know one another, and their ardor is increased by their number. The association gathers the efforts of divergent minds in a cluster and drives them vigorously toward a single goal clearly indicated by it.

Sampson et al. (2005, p. 679) find that the critical predictor of community mobilization is “the presence of established institutions and organizations that may be appropriated in the service of emergent action.”

What sorts of local associations are most likely to be appropriated in service of a BOR resolution? First, groups whose core mission is the preservation of civil liberties. The ACLU is the key organization of this type in the United States. The ACLU has great expertise in legal issues central to the Patriot Act and related executive orders, has taken a strong stand in the courts against the Bush administration’s policies, and supported the fledgling BORDC soon after its creation. Its local chapter
members provide a ready-made constituency for local action and are well placed to recruit others.

A second set of relevant associations are those concerned with progressive causes like social justice, peace, human rights, women’s rights, and the environment. These movements are oriented toward collective rather than distributive interests and support the kinds of groups likely to be targeted via the Patriot Act. Progressive groups also embody the logic of the slogan “think globally, act locally,” viewing participatory democracy within communities as an end in itself as well as an effective tactic. Talanian and other founders of the BOR campaign are themselves activists with experience in the antiapartheid struggle and related causes.

Colleges and universities provide a third organizational locus for the BOR campaign. The mission of higher education, as well as the sensibilities of many faculty, staff, and students, makes these institutions a natural base for a social movement that seeks to protect civil liberties. Universities are also likely to be centers of antiwar sentiment and have been targets of FBI investigations conducted under the Patriot Act (Brasch 2005). The BORDC began in a college town, and a number of institutions of higher education have passed BOR resolutions covering their campus (these are not included in the events we study, which are restricted to municipal resolutions).

Finally, churches and other religious groups are potential sites for BOR mobilization. There is less of an a priori argument that these groups are natural allies of a civil liberties campaign—indeed, church membership and religious belief are associated with weak support for civil liberties (McClosky and Brill 1983). Nevertheless, religious groups are perhaps the most robust associational formation in American civil society and a major source of voluntarism around issues of social justice (Smith 1996; Wuthnow 1999).

Diffusion Dynamics

A third line of inquiry examines the diffusion structure of BOR resolutions across municipalities. Much contemporary research on social movements focuses on mechanisms that generate interdependencies between protest events and that describe the dynamics of protest cycles. We focus on two such processes, one centering on the spatial structure of intermunicipal contagion and the second on the temporal evolution of the BOR campaign.

Efforts at political mobilization are highly contagious, particularly when successful (Conell and Cohn 1995). The passage of BOR resolutions elsewhere provides valuable resources for their advocates in cities that have not yet taken action. Debates and mobilizing efforts spill across municipal boundaries, potential supporters become more aware and better
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educated, and proponents learn that they may in fact carry the day. Most broadly, the passage of resolutions elsewhere helps legitimate a novel and potentially risky action. As one activist told us:

There is a concern about getting too far out ahead, or taking a stand that would seem radical. In a place like Berkeley, that’s a badge of honor, but for most councils that’s not the case, so to be able to say that the council of a little more conservative place has adopted this, or that a big city adopted this, is very helpful. This way they don’t feel they are taking any particular risks or that they won’t be singled out by somebody for criticism.

We treat intermunicipal contagion as a spatial phenomenon since events occurring nearby are more visible and influential (Hedström 1994; Myers 1997). We first perform preliminary analyses that seek to determine how the intensity of contagion falls off with distance and then use these analyses to define geographic catchment areas within which influence is likely to be strong.13

In addition to local interdependencies, the legitimacy of BOR resolutions is likely to grow over time in concert with broader shifts in American security concerns. When the BOR campaign began in late 2001, public support for civil liberties was low. According to a Pew Center study, in the weeks following 9/11 a majority of Americans believed it would be necessary to sacrifice some personal freedoms to fight terrorism effectively. This figure dropped to 49% by June 2002 and to 38% by July 2004.14 Approval of President Bush’s job performance fell more dramatically, from about 90% shortly after the 9/11 attacks to the low forties in 2005. As public opinion shifted, attention to the erosion of civil liberties gained traction.

Much diffusion analysis finds that the causal impact of adopter characteristics is inversely related to legitimacy of the practice that is spreading. In organizational and policy studies this often takes the form of a two-stage process, where a contested innovation whose adoption is initially driven by internal factors becomes a taken-for-granted practice that

13 We should also note that data restrictions limit the scope and precision of this article’s investigation of contagion. While we study all cities with more than 25,000 people that might pass resolutions, we do not examine resolutions passed by other public authorities—smaller towns and villages, counties, and states. The resulting incomplete-data problem reduces the efficiency of our estimates of contagion but is not a necessary source of bias given our focus on the structure of intermunicipal influence (Greve, Tuma, and Strang 2001).

spreads rapidly without reference to local conditions. Tolbert and Zucker’s (1983) analysis of the diffusion of civil service reform provides a paradigmatic case. They show that early adoption was linked to city characteristics like the size of the immigrant population, while later adoption was disconnected from the conditions that reforms were designed to address.

We anticipate that the same dynamic may arise in the BOR campaign. The passage of the first resolutions must have required strong constituencies willing to buck the tide. As mainstream political sentiment moves toward the BORDC position, an increasingly varied array of cities become liable to pass resolutions. Political, associational, and demographic conditions that were critical to municipal action early in the campaign should recede in significance as the BOR position gains broader acceptance.

DATA AND METHODS

We develop an event history analysis of the passage of BOR resolutions. This regressionlike framework focuses attention on municipal characteristics linked to the timing of adoption while facilitating the study of diffusion dynamics linking prior and potential adopters (Strang and Tuma 1993). To concretize and further pursue the relationships identified in the quantitative analysis, we then draw on interviews conducted with local and regional activists who had extensive experience with the campaign, and we inspect the composition of BOR coalitions in four cities.

Dates of municipal resolutions are taken from BORDC, which maintains a comprehensive national list at its Web site (http://www.bordc.org). The observation period begins October 26, 2001—the day the Patriot Act was signed into federal law—and ends August 1, 2005. While some resolutions have passed since that date, the rate of adoption generally slowed after the fall of 2004 (see fig. 1). The analysis thus covers the bulk of the BOR campaign to date.

The “risk set” of potential BOR adopters, for the purposes of this study, consists of the 1,071 American cities with populations above 25,000. These represent over three-eighths of all municipalities with resolutions, although they form a much smaller subset of the wide variety of incorporated cities, towns, and villages of any size in the United States. To

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15 Given our focus on political and associational factors, data collection problems prevented the analysis of all 25,375 American cities, towns, villages, and hamlets. Examination of a much broader array of public authorities would permit a closer analysis of contagion but less attention to city characteristics. Overall, smaller municipalities were modest laggards relative to the towns and cities studied here. In the first two years of the campaign, 56% of resolution-adopting municipalities were below the 25,000-person cutoff; in the following two years, this percentage rose to 60%.
investigate the possible consequences of size thresholds, we performed a series of analyses imposing population floors above 25,000 and found little sensitivity in relationships of theoretical interest.

The major methodological concern here, as in most event history studies, involves unmeasured time dependence—temporal patterns in the passage of BOR resolutions that are not captured by time-constant and time-varying factors. National political events, such as the beginning of the Iraq War in March 2003 or the 2004 election, may influence the determinants of new resolutions in ways that cannot be compactly modeled within a parametric framework. We employ partial likelihood methods for proportional hazards to control for all forms of common time dependence. Since time is indexed on a historical axis, these include shifts in the broader national and international context and changes in strategy by central players like the BORDC and the ACLU. We also supplement whole-period models with analyses that divide the campaign into early and late periods to develop a positive analysis of change in causal factors.

Covariates

Results from the 2000 presidential election are used to describe the municipal political leanings. These include votes for George W. Bush (Republican Party), Albert A. Gore (Democratic Party), Ralph Nader (Green Party), Harry Browne (Libertarian Party), and Patrick J. Buchanan (Reform Party), taken from the national records assembled by the Federal Elections Project (Lublin and Voss 2001). This source aggregates precinct data to the county; we spread electoral data across cities when they lie within a single county and combine data across counties for cities that encompass multiple counties.16

Measures of the density of local associations are drawn from Gale’s Encyclopedia of Associations online database.17 Total associations includes a wide variety of groups, from industry coalitions and trade unions to federated national groups like the Fraternal Order of Eagles and the NAACP to soccer and bowling leagues. Within this total, we used Gale data to identify the number of progressive associations within the municipality, defined as groups concerned with civil rights, social justice, peace, and the environment. Other associations gives the number of all

16 Some measurement error is involved in this procedure. To assess its seriousness, we performed a pair of exploratory analyses using vote totals from the 1988 election, when both municipal and county data were available, and found no qualitative shift in the pattern of results.

other groups based in the municipality (i.e., total associations minus progressive associations). All measures are standardized by population.

The presence of a chapter of the ACLU, the major national organization concerned with civil liberties, is drawn from that organization’s Web site (http://www.aclu.org/affiliates/). The number of universities in each municipality is taken from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (http://nces.ed.gov/ipeds/data.asp). Like the Gale-based covariates, both indicators are scaled on a per capita basis.

Participation in churches and other religious associations is measured by percentages of adherents. The Glenmary Survey of Churches and Church Membership provides figures for some 133 denominations across all U.S. counties for 1990 (Bradley et al. 1992), which we map onto municipalities. In addition to the total density of religious adherents, we follow Iannaccone (1994) in dividing denominations on a doctrinal basis, distinguishing conservative, moderate, and liberal Protestant churches; Protestant sects; the Catholic Church; and a heterogeneous other faiths category.

Intermunicipal contagion is modeled by forming counts of prior resolutions occurring within some set of relevant cities. Our focus was on how the intensity of contagion varies with distance from the focal city. Distances were calculated from each city’s latitude and longitude, taken from the U.S. Census Bureau. Preliminary analyses across a range of spatial neighborhoods (up to 15, 30, 60, and 120 miles and more than 120 miles) suggested a fairly constant gradient up to 60 miles and then a distinct falloff. We thus examine intermunicipal influence by counting the number of prior BOR resolutions within a 60-mile radius.\footnote{We also examined contagion in absolute vs. relative terms: as a function of the number of BOR-resolution adopters within the neighborhood vs. the ratio of adopters to potential adopters within the neighborhood (since some American cities are surrounded by many neighbors while others have none). Measures based on the number of adopters have larger and more robust effects.}

Analyses also include municipal population (logged) and average education level (percentage of the adult population with a college degree), taken from census statistics. Table 1 provides a summary of covariates and sources.

RESULTS

The following group of tables report partial likelihood estimates of the impact of municipal characteristics on the city’s hazard of passing a BOR resolution. We begin in table 2 with the effects of intercity contagion and the municipality’s political profile, and in the next table we add measures...
TABLE 1

MEANS, SDs, AND SOURCES OF VARIABLES USED IN THE EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In population</td>
<td>10.99</td>
<td>.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>22.76</td>
<td>11.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior resolutions within a 60-mile radius</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>3.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal political profile (votes per 100 registered voters):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for all presidential candidates</td>
<td>42.56</td>
<td>8.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Bush (Republican Party)</td>
<td>20.67</td>
<td>12.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Buchanan (Reform Party)</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Gore (Democratic Party)</td>
<td>21.86</td>
<td>12.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Nader (Green Party)</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>1.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Browne (Libertarian Party)</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal associational profile (per capita):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLU (per 100 people)</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total associations</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive associations</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other associations</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious groups (adherents per 1,000 people):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total churches</td>
<td>531.47</td>
<td>144.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
<td>222.56</td>
<td>156.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Protestant churches</td>
<td>71.69</td>
<td>95.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Protestant churches</td>
<td>42.42</td>
<td>41.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Protestant churches</td>
<td>28.73</td>
<td>20.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant sects</td>
<td>19.20</td>
<td>13.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other faiths</td>
<td>141.44</td>
<td>94.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of associational density. The last table provides results from partial likelihood models that allow causal effects to shift over time.

Model 1 in table 2 shows that BOR resolutions passed more quickly in larger cities and in cities where the average education level was higher. Both relationships are consistent with the survey literature on civil liberties, which finds that residents of larger cities and more educated respondents exhibit pro–civil liberties attitudes. Indeed, Sullivan et al. (1993, p. 29) describe the link between education and support for civil liberties as “one of the most durable generalizations in this whole area of inquiry.”

Model 2 adds the effect of local contagion, as indexed by the number of neighboring cities within a 60-mile radius that had already passed BOR

19 The effects of population size could alternatively reflect scale economies in political mobilization, though it is not clear a priori whether it requires proportionately more or less mobilization to influence professional politicians on a city council vs. amateur selectmen in a small town. Additional analyses found no relationship between BOR resolutions and the form of municipal government (council/mayor vs. council/manager structure).
resolutions. Each proximate resolution increases the focal city’s hazard by 8% \(\exp[.07]\). The net result is substantial, particularly for cities in the metropolitan agglomerations surrounding San Francisco, Boston, and New York. For example, a “laggard” like Santa Clara in the Bay Area is estimated to have a relative hazard in 2005 that is 4.05 \(\exp[.07 \times 20]\) times larger than the one it had in 2001.

While overall voting rates in the 2000 presidential election are not linked to the passage of BOR resolutions, the composition of the vote across candidates has strong effects. Cities that voted in greater numbers for Al Gore and for Ralph Nader were more likely to pass BOR resolutions and to do so earlier. Cities that strongly supported George Bush and Pat Buchanan were less likely to promulgate resolutions and/or to pass them later. Only votes for the Libertarian candidate, Harry Browne, lack a statistically significant relationship to BOR resolutions.\(^{20}\)

Vote totals should not be mechanically interpreted as indexing individual support or partisan mobilization. We should not imagine, for example, that the fate of a BOR resolution is decided by a pitched battle between 60 Nader and 30 Buchanan voters on the town hall steps, with

\(^{20}\) Additional analyses (not shown) included a measure of the voting record of the city’s congressional representative, which provides an alternative way to capture the political leanings of the municipality. Cities represented by more conservative members of Congress (as indexed by Poole and Rosenthal [1997]) were slower to pass BORDC resolutions.
crowds of Gore and Bush supporters cheering on their respective sides and 25 Libertarians sipping lattes. Voting totals are better understood as markers of the city’s political traditions and culture.21

While the magnitude of the Nader and Buchanan coefficients is tied to their low vote totals, they more significantly reflect the unambiguous perspectives on civil liberties and national security that each candidate represented. For Nader and the Green Party, these include broad-based support for individual liberties and civil rights, opposition to a garrison state, and the goal of building participatory democracy at the local level. Buchanan’s nativist populism is consistent with harsh security measures, particularly when these are targeted at foreign enemies and recent immigrants. In the days immediately following 9/11, Buchanan proposed a moratorium on immigration, rapid expansion of the U.S. Border Patrol, and the deportation of “eight-to-eleven million illegal aliens, beginning with those from rogue nations” (Zolberg 2002, p. 287). While Buchanan also opposed the invasion of Iraq as an imperialist adventure, it makes good sense that his supporters in 2000 would be unlikely to side with minorities at risk.

Finally, the dog that didn’t bark is of considerable interest. Electoral support for the Libertarian candidate, Harry Browne, has a weak and statistically nonsignificant relationship to the passage of BOR resolutions. This is striking since the Libertarian Party has the strongest doctrinal connection to the principle of individual liberty of the parties represented in table 2. Libertarians may have been caught between their principles and their politics; they supported civil liberties but hesitated to publicly attack a conservative administration. And as a number of activists noted in interviews, libertarians eschew the sort of community-based organizing that municipal resolutions depend upon. While passionately opposing government intrusion, they have little taste for grassroots mobilization and the coalition building it requires. There is a strong contrast here to the Green Party, whose antiestablishment ethos leads not only to opposition to potential abuses of government power but also to a commitment to

21 This is especially relevant where minor-party candidates are concerned, since their vote totals underestimate true levels of support but may capture distinctive political dispositions. A high vote count for Nader can be interpreted as evidence of a vibrant progressive subculture, while support for Buchanan signals a tradition of social conservatism. Recall also that none of the candidates campaigned on the issues that the 9/11 attacks brought to the fore; the causal chain runs from underlying political dispositions as indexed by the November 2000 election to subsequent tendencies to mobilize around the protection of civil liberties.
grassroots political action and building a movement for change from the bottom up.\textsuperscript{22}

The robust relationship between municipal political profiles and BOR resolutions is signaled in two ways. First, the inclusion of candidate electoral support improves model fit dramatically. Second, the substantial effect of contagion within spatial neighborhoods falls to virtually zero and loses statistical significance when we control for patterns of electoral support.\textsuperscript{23} This is a remarkable result, since social movement research generally finds that successful outcomes are contagious. (We should forewarn the reader, however, that the separate period analyses presented in table 4 provide robust evidence of contagion during the early phase of the BOR campaign.)

Overall, table 2 indicates that political attitudes constitute a key cleavage structure relevant to mobilization around BOR resolutions. Liberal-leaning communities were quick to adopt resolutions, while more politically conservative communities were slow to do so. Relative support for Bush and Gore is part of this pattern but not its most salient feature. Most telling are votes for candidates on the political extremes, represented by Nader as a progressive populist and Buchanan as a conservative populist.

Local Associations
Table 3 examines the relationship between local associations and the BOR campaign (these analyses control for vote composition and all other factors examined in model 4 in table 2). The first analysis shows that cities with more voluntary associations per capita were quicker to pass BOR resolutions. This accords with Tocqueville’s celebration of the capacity of locally organized groups to energize public opinion and check the power of the central state.

Models 2 and 3 indicate, respectively, that the passage of BOR reso-

\textsuperscript{22} The lack of statistical significance is not simply a function of the small size of the Libertarian vote, which is modestly smaller than support for Buchanan. Reported relationships are also not an artifact of restricted access (Browne was excluded from the ballot in Arizona, Buchanan in Michigan and Washington, D.C.). Analyses excluding cities in these states, which do report write-in totals for each candidate, parallel those shown above.

\textsuperscript{23} Political covariates also eliminate regional effects. On average, western and northeastern cities were quicker to adopt resolutions than midwestern cities, while southern cities were slower. These differentials are maintained when we control for population size and education, but they disappear when political covariates are included in the model.
TABLE 3

PARTIAL LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE PASSAGE OF BILL OF RIGHTS RESOLUTIONS IN CITIES WITH MORE THAN 25,000 INHABITANTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total associations</td>
<td>.69***</td>
<td>.65**</td>
<td>.57***</td>
<td>.56***</td>
<td>.48***</td>
<td>.38***</td>
<td>.31***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLU</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive associations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11.17***</td>
<td>10.89***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other associations</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total churches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>-.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic Church</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
<td>(.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>churches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.013**</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>churches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberal Protestant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>(.002)</td>
<td>(.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>churches</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant sects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.013**</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other faiths</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.011</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
<td>(.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood ratio</td>
<td>272.6</td>
<td>251.2</td>
<td>285.1</td>
<td>267.9</td>
<td>248.4</td>
<td>263.7</td>
<td>312.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>df</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.—All models control for population, education, prior resolutions within spatial neighborhood, and voting in the 2000 presidential election. All models include the covariates in model 4 from table 2.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$. 
olutions is accelerated by the presence of local ACLU chapters and pro-
gegressive political associations. The latter, which include groups concerned with social justice, peace, and the environment, have an impact that is two orders of magnitude larger than that of other kinds of civic associations. Indeed, the key result here is that once we include a measure of progressive political associations, the presence of organizations like the Kiwanis, the Loyal Order of the Moose, and bowling leagues is not a statistically significant predictor of the passage of BOR resolutions. It is not associational social capital in general that stimulates municipal action but associational social capital of a particular sort: progressive groups likely to align with the campaign and take it on as their own.

The local presence of universities also promotes the passage of BOR resolutions, a relationship that is most visible in college towns. In fact, the earliest adopters of BOR resolutions read like stops on a college speaking tour: Ann Arbor, Michigan; Madison, Wisconsin; Boulder, Colorado; Berkeley, California; Eugene, Oregon; and Cambridge, Massachusetts, were among the first 10 BOR successes. Larger cities with significant college populations were also well represented, though Boston was one of a small number of cities that formally entertained but did not pass a BOR resolution.24

There is little connection between BOR resolutions and the density of overall church membership, though resolutions passed more quickly in cities where liberal Protestants were well represented. This reminds us of the long-standing role of some churches as focal points for liberal dissent (Wuthnow and Evans 2002), a tradition that antedates the United States and even its colonial origins. As one activist from Massachusetts noted:

> In our state the Unitarian Universalist Church has been around for a long time, they are known for their involvement in social justice issues, and they’ve been taking an incredibly strong stand on this. They took it up officially across the country and made it a priority issue to organize around.

Once again, these results speak to the relevance of organizational mission and identity rather than social capital per se. The mainline Protestant groups that are positively linked to BOR resolutions tend to be ideologically progressive but organizationally weak (Iannaccone 1994).25

24 According to the local activist we interviewed, the failure to adopt a resolution in Boston was not due to a lack of grassroots mobilization but to the opposition of a city councillor who “gets to exercise this thing called Article 5, which means he gets to say what is council business and what isn’t. And he says council business just has to do with the schools and fixing the roads.”

25 We also developed a doctrinally neutral measure of adherence to “civically engaged churches,” following Tolbert, Lyson, and Irwin (1998). The density of these groups bore a negative but statistically nonsignificant relationship to BOR resolutions.
Model 7 jointly examines the various types of associations examined in models 1–6 (total associations and overall religious density are not included since their disaggregated components are represented in the model). This summary analysis shows that progressive political groups and universities are the key associational predictors of BORDC passage nationwide. Once these two sets of organizations are taken into account, local ACLU chapters and the community’s religious profile have little explanatory power.

Early Period versus Late Period Adoption

Table 4 examines shifts in the impact of municipal characteristics over the course of the BOR campaign. While the Cox modeling framework employed here is robust to many forms of time dependence, it implies static causal effects, where each covariate multiplies the hazard by a constant amount at every point in time. We replace this assumption with a less restrictive (though still very simple) two-period model.

Table 4 contrasts the hazard of BOR passage in the first two years of the campaign, from October 26, 2001, to September 25, 2003, with the later period, from September 26, 2003, to August 1, 2005. This cutoff date was selected to slice the adoption series in half. (We experimented with a range of cutoffs and found little sensitivity to the precise date; if periods are divided in a way that leads less than a third of events to take place within either the early or late period, however, the statistical power of the analysis during that period declines substantially.) All cities are at risk at the beginning of the first period, while only those that have not yet adopted are at risk at the beginning of the second. We examine a model that includes the key effects identified in tables 2 and 3: population, education level, spatial contagion, votes for president, and presence of the ACLU, progressive political associations and other associations, and universities (religious groupings do not have significant effects in either period).

Covariates that describe the strength of progressive political tendencies within the municipality have strong effects in the early period and considerably smaller ones later on. While significant throughout, the magnitude of the Nader effect is twice as large in the first two years of the campaign as in the two years that follow. The impact of progressive political associations also declines substantially in magnitude and is not statistically significant in the latter phase of the campaign.

We interpret these shifts as the consequence of an evolving national political environment, where initially clear-cut support for aggressive anti-terrorism (both inside and outside the United States) diminished gradually.
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TABLE 4  
PARTIAL LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF THE PASSAGE OF BILL OF RIGHTS  
RESOLUTIONS (Early Period vs. Late Period Adoption)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Early Period Adoption</th>
<th>Late Period Adoption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In population</td>
<td>0.55*** (0.11)</td>
<td>1.03*** (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0.03*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prior resolutions within a 60-mile radius</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.15*** (0.04)</td>
<td>0.03 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Bush</td>
<td>-9.36** (3.07)</td>
<td>0.09 (1.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Buchanan</td>
<td>-264.01 (181.04)</td>
<td>-478.64** (182.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Gore</td>
<td>1.71 (3.02)</td>
<td>7.61** (2.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Nader</td>
<td>64.02*** (12.34)</td>
<td>34.42** (13.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Votes for Browne</td>
<td>-35.03 (148.90)</td>
<td>158.53 (98.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLU</td>
<td>-0.01 (.46)</td>
<td>.33 (.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Progressive associations</td>
<td>12.91*** (3.91)</td>
<td>7.87 (4.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other associations</td>
<td>-0.14 (.31)</td>
<td>.26 (.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Universities</td>
<td>0.38* (1.17)</td>
<td>.65*** (.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood ratio (df = 11)</td>
<td>197.9</td>
<td>146.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $P < .05$.  
** $P < .01$.  
*** $P < .001$.

over time. This was in part a result of the success of the campaign itself. As one activist told us:

Now that so many resolutions have been passed, it is so much easier than it was in the early days, when city councillors were saying, "Why should we do this? This is not in our realm of responsibilities, this is something for the federal government—we should be fixing potholes." Now it’s much different, they want their city or town to be part of this movement, to be standing up for the rights of their citizens.

In the heightened security climate that followed 9/11, the local strength of progressive parties and associations was a crucial predictor of municipal action on a BOR resolution. As the political mainstream moved toward the positions held by the Green Party and by civil rights, peace, and social justice groups, the relationship between the local density of these groups and city resolutions weakened—not because the level of progressive interest and activity diminished but because that of other groups expanded.

The effects of other covariates also change in ways that reflect growing mainstream support for BOR resolutions. In the early period, the strength of the pro-Bush vote is negatively related to passage; in the late period, support for Gore has a positive effect. Education matters early but not later on. And most significantly, the negative impact of votes for Buchanan grows over time. As the BOR campaign became more palatable to those

PROOF 24
in the middle of the spectrum, the opposition of the hard right became an increasingly salient predictor of nonpassage.

Another key shift is in intermunicipal patterns of influence. In the first half of the BOR campaign, resolutions in nearby cities have a substantial effect, increasing the rate of adoption within the spatial neighborhood by some 16%. In the second half of the diffusion process, there is no evidence of local contagion. Like the diminishing impact of votes for Nader or the density of progressive associations, this makes good sense. When BOR resolutions were unpopular and potentially hazardous steps for a city council to take, their passage in a neighboring town had important legitimating and mobilizing effects. As the mainstream moved toward the BOR movement, the boost provided by these signals was less decisive.

The declining contagiousness of nearby resolutions also suggests a shift from relational to nonrelational bases of diffusion (Strang and Meyer 1993). In the early stage of the campaign, personal relationships between activists and the multistranded ties that link neighboring cities were critical to intermunicipal influence and demonstration effects. As BOR resolutions gained legitimacy, nonrelational attributions of similarity and thinner, longer-distance relationships became strong enough to carry the freight. The ties that generated strong patterns of spatial clustering gave way to a broader bandwagon dynamic.\(^2^6\)

The effect of population size, by contrast, tends to rise over time. This illustrates a different sense in which the BOR campaign gained political ground. In both periods, larger cities were quicker to pass resolutions than smaller cities were. But it is only in the later stages of the campaign that the nation’s giant urban centers—like New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago—became “civil liberties safe zones.”

Finally, the increasing impact of local universities comes as some surprise, since the earliest adopters were often college towns. But the interrelationships between university presence and support for progressive political causes are hard to disentangle in cities like Berkeley, Madison, and Ithaca, New York. In the later period, resolutions were passed in university towns like East Lansing, Michigan, and Ames, Iowa, whose political profiles are less in line with the BOR position. (Models that exclude political profiles and associational density show little change in the impact of university presence over the two periods.)

While far from universal, we suspect the diffusion dynamic seen in the BOR campaign appears in a variety of social movement settings. When

\(^2^6\) Also see Davis and Greve (1997), who argue in a comparative study of organizational innovation that a more legitimate practice can diffuse across thin relations (in their case, board interlocks), while a less legitimate one requires “safety in numbers” and strong ties.
a protest issue gains legitimacy and mainstream support, the conditions for successful mobilization change in fundamental ways. There is a reduction in the degree of community mobilization required to generate action, declining dependence on the original core coalition, increasing salience of opponents at the other extreme, and a diminishing direct effect of contagion, particularly via personal relationships and strong ties. Where the fortunes of the campaign move in the other direction and an initially mainstream movement is marginalized, the same sequence should occur in reverse.

Bill of Rights Coalitions in Four Cities
To develop a concrete picture of BOR mobilization, we examine the groups that successfully sponsored resolutions in four cities: Boise, Idaho; Columbia, South Carolina; Dallas; and New York City. While not representative, the four cases span a significant portion of the sample space, differing substantially in size, geographic location, and political traditions. We conducted telephone interviews with activists in all four cities and obtained lists of organizational sponsors in Columbia, Dallas, and New York (Boise did not develop a formal coalition). Figure 3 classifies the organizational sponsors of the measure into 10 categories, based on a reading of each group’s mission statement and other publicly available information (10 of 199 BOR sponsors fell into a miscellaneous category). Coalition members are listed in the appendix.

Progressives played central roles in all four mobilizing efforts. The Green Party and its local affiliates (like the Brooklyn, Bronx, and Queens Greens) were BOR sponsors in each of the three cities where formal coalitions arose. In Boise, the initial home of the mobilizing effort was the Green Party, and the key activist one of its members. Other left-of-liberal parties include democrats.com (the “aggressive progressives”) and two Democratic Socialist groups, the United Citizens Party and the Working Families Party.

Progressive social movement organizations were also richly represented. Peace and social justice groups like Code Pink and Not in Our Name (New York), Pax Christi and House the Homeless (Dallas), and Hilton Head for Peace and S.C. Fair Share (Columbia) made up a significant portion of BOR coalition members. They were joined by groups whose missions centered on human rights and its intersection with gender, sexual orientation, and race/ethnicity. These included Act Up, Church Ladies for Choice, and Jews for Racial and Economic Justice (in New York); the Texas Stonewall Democratic Caucus, Amnesty International, and the American-Muslim Alliance (in Dallas); and the Grimke Sisters, Planned Parenthood, and the NAACP (in Columbia). The Idaho Peace Coalition
and United Vision for Idaho (a “coalition of progressive organizations”) were key supporters of the Boise resolution. A New York City activist summed up the “big tent” that assembled:

We have over 97 organizations that we work with—everything from Arab-Muslim organizations, to antiwar groups, to general social justice groups, to traditional civil rights groups, from big groups to small community groups. It’s really remarkable—that’s a powerhouse!

Another activist noted:

Other constituencies might be ethnic organizations, such as Arab or Japanese American groups. On the West Coast, the Japanese American groups are important because they understand the historical tie with World War II internment and they make that connection publicly.

While mobilizing efforts in all four cities drew heavily on the progressive community, they were not limited to it. The Libertarian Party was a member of municipal coalitions in New York and Dallas and in the latter city was joined by the like-minded Republican Liberty Caucus and Constitution Party (all three stand for a limited government role and the principle of personal liberty). In Boise, the Constitution Party was an important organizational proponent of the BOR resolution, and individual members of the Libertarian Party, the National Rifle Association (NRA), and the John Birch Society were active participants.

The variety of civic associations that joined BOR coalitions is also
striking. Churches and other religious groups were a substantial component, making up 8%–15% of coalition members. A wide range of religious doctrines was represented, from the Columbia Meeting of Quakers to the Brooklyn Center for Ethical Culture to the Islamic Circle of North America. Professional associations involving doctors, lawyers, booksellers, and librarians were BOR sponsors. Labor unions were coalition members in all three cities and in Dallas were joined by businesses as well.

The mix of BOR supporters varied across the cities, with the Dallas coalition standing out as the most heterogeneous. When we combine the groups that would be coded as “progressive associations” in the hazard analysis, their numbers add up to about 60% of the coalition in New York and Columbia versus 40% in Dallas. The Dallas BORDC was also the only case we studied where rightist parties outnumbered leftist parties and where corporations outnumbered unions.

The breadth of BORDC coalitions was not a simple reflection of the pool of concerned citizens and organizations in each municipality. It resulted instead from a purposive political strategy and a well-planned mobilizing effort. If civil liberties proponents were going to succeed, particularly in conservative cities, they needed support from across the political spectrum. A Dallas activist explained:

A longtime friend of mine said to me, “This is absurd; there is no way we can pass this resolution in Dallas, the home of George Bush and Dick Cheney.” This is a very conservative city; it’s the number-one source of funds for the Bush administration in the world, so a lot of people said we can’t do it. We said no, this is a nonpartisan issue and we need to actively recruit people from the right wing as well as the left wing. We organized ourselves into committees and we divided tasks in order to be more efficient; we were actively seeking sponsors or endorsers. We worked very hard to attract many different groups. We were told, for example, that the Libertarian Party, through the nature of their beliefs, doesn’t ever endorse anybody. But, after getting quite a few no’s, we finally found someone in the official hierarchy that gave us an entree to getting endorsed by the Libertarian Party.

Support from local business elites was also critical to overcoming opposition within the city council.

I realized that if we were just the same old group—the Dallas Peace Center—we usually get ignored. But if we are able to marshal some power players behind you, suddenly their ears pick up and they pay attention. We had the list of financial contributions to each of the city council members and we went through them line by line and we asked, “Does anybody know this person?” With respect to the representatives of the powerful white suburbs of Dallas, for example, some of them were horribly against us from the outset. But their opposition became muted because all of the sudden a
What kinds of associations seldom joined BOR coalitions? Prominent by their absence are the large organizations that stand at the mainstream of American civic and political life and that often play a key integrative role. The major service and fraternal associations linked to the business community—the Rotary, Elks, Moose, and the like—were not involved in the mobilization efforts we examined. Nor were the two major parties. This is unsurprising where the Republicans are concerned; fear of being cast as weak on terrorism helps to explain the Democratic Party’s involvement in only one of the four mobilizing efforts. An insider/outsider distinction may have also come into play, in line with Sniderman et al.’s (1996) finding that establishment party elites view wiretapping more charitably than do members of minor parties on either the left or the right.

Finally, we note the small number of BOR sponsors whose missions centered on civil liberties as such. These groups, like the Loyal Nine and the National Coalition against Censorship, made up about 5% of coalition members in New York, Columbia, and Dallas. The ACLU was an important participant in all four cities and played a key role in situating Bush administration policies relative to prior legal practice and constitutional principles. But the coalitions reviewed here depended primarily on groups that identified connections between their substantive civic and political visions and the Patriot Act. Few were civil liberties specialists.

The concrete cases of BOR mobilization in New York City, Dallas, Columbia, and Boise add to the hazard analyses reported in tables 2–4 in two main ways. First, they show that the progressive groups whose local density is linked to early adoption of BOR resolutions were in fact active participants who helped to bring these resolutions about. Progressive groups and leftist parties were key players in all four cities. Indeed, the role of progressives is underestimated when we simply count coalition members. In all four cities, the individuals who worked hard to bring these coalitions into being (and who served as our informants) were themselves progressives.

While predictive factors in tables 2–4 also appear as actors in figure 3, the converse does not hold. A number of groups whose local density does not predict the early passage of resolutions (like Libertarians, a wide swath of civic associations, and churches) were nevertheless important contributors to municipal mobilizing efforts. The range of participants in BOR coalitions was substantially broader than a literal reading of the hazard analyses would suggest. While politically progressive cities were faster to adopt resolutions than politically moderate cities, and moderate cities
faster than conservative ones, moderates and conservatives formed a significant component of BOR coalitions.

Our focus has been on substantive matters; however, the disparity between what we learn from the hazard analysis and the inspection of particular coalitions warrants attention. Why do the two provide different insights?

First, hazard analyses reflect relative rates of social movement participation, while coalitions record positive instances. Some associations may be prominent coalition members but nevertheless underrepresented in comparison to their centrality in the municipality as a whole. This is particularly likely where overall density is high. Religious associations are a good example; churches and other religious groups were a significant element in coalitions but not out of proportion to their role in American civil society.

Second, hazard analyses reflect a variety of pathways linking groups to social movement outcomes, only one of which is direct participation in collective action. A large Green Party vote is a good predictor of BOR resolutions, not only because Green parties and their members are frequent and central participants of BOR coalitions, but because cities with many Green voters tend to be home to many like-minded organizations as well and because public servants in communities that vote Green often share the ambition of creating a civil liberties safe zone. On the other side of the ledger, the Libertarian Party vote is not associated with BOR resolutions, not only because Libertarians are less likely to form or join municipal coalitions, but because cities with this political profile may have few organizations likely to pursue municipal resolutions and city councils likely to be unsympathetic to the proposals that are put before them.

Multiple pathways also help us understand cases where statistically significant effects in hazard analyses are not reflected in visible actors. For example, universities were not involved in any of the coalitions we examined, although the density of local universities is one of the strongest predictors of BOR passage. Institutions of higher education are linked to the passage of BOR resolutions by routes other than coalition membership; individual students, faculty, and campus organizations are likely to take up the cause of civil liberties, and colleges and universities contribute to a progressive/liberal culture that is reflected in a wide variety of community organizations.

The insights provided by regressionlike hazard analysis and case histories of mobilization complement each other. Hazard analysis specifies conditions associated with social movement success across a wide range of cases.

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27 Colleges and universities are important to all four of the cities where we examined BOR coalitions. Columbia is the home of the University of South Carolina.
of instances and represents the impact of indirect mechanisms that are not readily observed. Case histories describe the process of mobilization and identify concrete actors, including groups whose presence in the community is not associated with successful outcomes.

DISCUSSION
From many perspectives, the cards were stacked against the BOR campaign. An extensive survey literature shows that support for civil liberties is thin where concrete security threats are at stake. There are no mass mobilizing civil liberties associations; the ACLU is a long-standing and important player in the courts but not an organization that can send its members into the streets or up the steps to city hall. Arab Americans, green card holders, and others most likely to be affected by the Patriot Act have little political muscle, particularly in the post-9/11 climate.

At a deeper level, declining levels of civic engagement undercut the social capital on which efforts to defend civil liberties might be expected to depend. High levels of partisan polarization make the contemporary political environment inhospitable to consensus movements. The form of the BOR campaign—resolutions by local authorities to defend civil liberties against the central government—is quintessentially Tocquevillean. But the social infrastructure generally thought to form the basis for Tocquevillean democracy seems in disrepair.

The success of this campaign to defend civil liberties is thus surprising. Some 400 cities, including New York, Los Angeles, and other major metropolitan centers, have endorsed BORDC resolutions. More than a quarter of the U.S. population resides in these municipal civil liberties safe zones. The campaign has also ascended the administrative hierarchy, appearing in some 54 counties and eight states. Resolutions have been promulgated across the United States, with the densest pockets along the Pacific Coast and the Northeast but with considerable activity in the Midwest, South, and mountain states.

What accounts for the number and geographic scope of BOR resolutions? The campaign was able to engage and activate a wide variety of organized groups whose defining goals stood outside the issue of civil liberties per se and could be in tension with one another. The BOR resolutions drew on the dense network of social movements, which forms a vibrant, and expanding, component of contemporary civil society. The organizational infrastructure, activist know-how, and political power of the campaign was not drawn from prior mobilization around civil liberties, which is weak, but from the larger social movement community, which is strong.
Progressives formed the leading edge of the BOR campaign. Hazard analyses find that cities with more liberal and left-leaning political cultures, as measured by votes in the 2000 presidential election, were markedly quicker to pass resolutions than cities whose denizens preferred Bush to Gore or Buchanan to Nader. Cities with large numbers of peace, social justice, civil rights, and environmental organizations were quick to pass resolutions. Progressive activists and a welter of movement groups and minor parties on the left played foundational roles in all four mobilizing efforts we examined.

The BOR campaign also mobilized individuals and associations outside the progressive community. The involvement of moderates and conservatives is not apparent in hazard analyses but becomes visible when we examine concrete municipal coalitions. Libertarians and other principled rightists took part in three of the four mobilizing efforts inspected here, as did a variety of churches, professional associations, and even a few businesses. And while none of these groups played the foundational role that left/liberal social movements did, their contribution appears to have grown over time. While the first BOR resolutions were promulgated in college towns, later resolutions were the work of broad coalitions whose representative character muted opposition among elected officials.

Our examination of the BOR campaign has drawn on two literatures central to the study of American civil society: survey research on attitudes toward civil liberties and archival investigation of civic engagement and the associational structure of the American polity. A number of relationships documented here are congruent with these lines of research. Consistent with the logic developed by Stouffer (1955) and McClosky and Brill (1983), larger cities with more educated populations were quicker to pass BOR resolutions. Consistent with Putnam (2000), local membership associations were central to an effort to defend civil liberties.

Nevertheless, the portrait of civil society in action developed here diverges from the dominant theoretical perspectives of both literatures, which treat support for civil liberties as an elite norm and community associations as founts of generalized social capital. These perspectives provide little purchase on the BOR campaign, which drew on social movements at the extremes of American political discourse rather than the major parties and civic organizations that stand in the middle. This article’s results are hard to square with an emphasis on elite “carriers of the creed” or the notion that social capital serves to lubricate all forms of public-spirited action. They point instead to the agency of politically identifiable groups and their purposeful mobilization toward contested ends.

The mobilization pattern seen in the BOR campaign converges with Sampson et al.’s (2005) broader analysis of contemporary civic/political
activism. Sampson et al. link variation in collective action events not to average levels of organizational membership or personal ties but to community associations that can be appropriated to promote collective goals. Relatedly, we find that indicators of overall civic engagement, like overall voting rates and associational density, do not predict early passage of BOR resolutions. The key was instead the presence of existing movement groups ready to take on the civil liberties banner. Indeed, BOR coalitions form the complement of Sampson et al.’s concept of “blended social action”—rather than marrying public claims for change with civic forms of organization, the BOR campaign married civic claims to social movement forms of organization.

What social mechanism undergirded BORDC’s success, if not the pathway from individual civic engagement to public spiritedness and social capital to municipal action? We see the key mechanism, in Vasi’s (2006) language, as inhering in the “miscibility” of multiple movements and causes—the capacity of groups with different agendas, traditions, and core beliefs to combine around a common banner. Municipal resolutions were promoted and achieved by locally organized coalitions that ran across rather than within preexisting movements. The fact that diverse coalitions could build bridges across their differences was crucial for the widespread diffusion of municipal efforts to defend civil liberties.

The idea that effective protest depends on the coaction of multiple groups is received wisdom in social movement research and may even be regarded as the defining characteristic of a social movement. McCarthy and Zald (1977) treat the recruitment and mobilization of diverse social groups as the core job of a social movement organization. Staggenborg (1986, p. 374) notes that “modern social movements are not monolithic entities, but consist of shifting coalitions of constituents from varying backgrounds who typically form a number of social movement organizations.” Meyer and Whittier (1994, p. 277) describe social movements as “a collection of formal organizations, informal networks, and unaffiliated individuals engaged in a more or less coherent struggle for change.” Much research explores coalitions within women’s rights (e.g., Rupp and Taylor 1990; Whittier 1995), civil rights (McAdam 1982; Morris 1984), environmental activism (Lichterman 1995; Shaffer 2000), and the nuclear freeze (Rochon and Meyer 1997).

The BOR campaign is nevertheless an exemplar in transcending the limitations of identity politics and the liberal-conservative divide. Even on college campuses, cross-movement events form less than 10% of all protests (Van Dyke 2003). Baldassarri and Diani’s (2007) analysis of the structure of civic networks emphasizes the strong bonds that arise within issue areas, while Armstrong’s (2002) analysis of the gay liberation movement emphasizes that coalitions within the New Left groups can lead to...
potentially paralyzing internal conflict. Much social movement analysis highlights the difficulty of building bridges across causes and constituencies—for example, see Rose (2000) on failed progressive-labor alliances. By contrast, the Dallas BORDC was described by city councillors as “the broadest, most diverse coalition ever to be put together in the history of Dallas, including the anti–Vietnam War movement, and the civil rights movement.”

The case of the BOR campaign thus helps us explore types of multimovement coalitions and the structural conditions that sustain them. We begin by distinguishing between strong miscibility and weak miscibility, a contrast that links group-level commonalities to distinctive modes of collaboration. We then consider situational factors—strategic and organizational characteristics of a social movement and the political opportunities it faces—that promote the growth of broad coalitions incorporating weakly as well as strongly miscible elements.28

Groups are strongly miscible when they are ideologically compatible and connected by interpersonal networks. Shared core beliefs lead potential allies to respond to the same events, present the issues to third parties in consistent ways, and find that interorganizational collaboration supports intraorganizational mobilization. Groups that share a tactical bent are able to act together effectively and harmoniously. Interpersonal connections permit ready communication, build a sense of unity, and help resolve conflicts that may arise.

The progressives who played a key role in the BOR campaign were miscible in this sense. The core values of participants in struggles for social justice, peace, women’s rights, and the environment center on postmaterialism and egalitarianism (Vasi 2006). Progressive causes embody staunch support for individual personal freedoms, a global sense of community, suspicion of the state and bureaucratic/corporate power, and identification with those most likely to be targeted by the Patriot Act. Progressives of many stripes agree about the value of participatory democracy within local communities.

Progressive movements are also relationally proximate, not only via cross-cutting friendships but through patterns of interlocking membership. Vasi (2006) and Fisher (2007) find high levels of overlapping participation in antiwar, antiglobalization, social justice, and environmental

28 For related investigations of specific events, see Gerhards and Rucht (1992) on anti-Reagan and anti–International Monetary Fund protests in Germany and Levi and Murphy (2006) on World Trade Organization protests in Seattle. Gerhards and Rucht primarily emphasize framing processes, while Levi and Murphy stress the development of credible commitments among coalition members. Van Dyke (2003) develops a quantitative analysis of the within- and cross-issue coalitions in college protest, linking the latter to common external enemies.
protest. We see much the same in the BOR coalition; as a BORDC informant from Massachusetts told us:

Here in our state we work close with everybody; it’s a very mixed bag. . . . Our state is not that big, so a lot of people wear more than one hat; the same people would be in peace or justice or civil liberties groups and there is a lot of cross-fertilization.

The visions and membership of these movements are so complexly intertwined, in fact, that it is useful to conceptualize them as comprising a durable “progressive community” (see Buechler 1990; Meyer and Whittier 1994).

Strong miscibility generates spontaneous collaborations that form rapidly and require little organizational infrastructure. Shared worldviews and high rates of network overlap lead to parallel responses to salient political opportunities or threats. Individuals embedded in the same activist network begin to coalesce, and, as they do so, linkages between the new cause and preexisting movement organizations arise naturally. Rather than overt coordination or negotiation between discrete entities, Vasi’s (2006) imagery of movements dissolving into one another captures the smooth flow of participants and themes across causes.

Speed, spontaneity, and informality are evident when central players describe the mobilization of the progressive cores of BOR coalitions. For example, an activist in Columbia recalled:

At the time I was working for the Carolina Peace Resource Center—we were worried about the attacks on civil liberties. A few people who were involved with the antiwar movement—a core group of about seven to eight people—started to meet regularly. We called ourselves “the living room group” because we met in someone’s living room. We would meet every couple of weeks and decide what to do next—we talked about how to get different groups on board. I knew a lot of people and some of the other people in our group knew a lot of people. We got things together relatively quickly; bit by bit we were getting more and more local groups on board.

And an activist in Texas described a similar scenario:

I am a longtime ACLU and Amnesty member, so I talked about these issues at the ACLU and Amnesty meetings. Other ACLU and Amnesty members were also members of the Green Party or had friends in the Green Party, and they were starting to get exercised about those issues. I was the link between some of these groups, but then we put out a notice on the Web and we got a larger group. We decided to have a meeting at the local bookstore with a few ACLU and Amnesty International members, and also some other people from the Green Party and the Dallas Peace Center. That’s when we decided that we’ll go forward and form a Bill of Rights Defense
Committee, using the information that Nancy Talanian and her group of Patriots have started to put out.

Groups are weakly miscible, by contrast, when they agree on a movement goal but lack a common ideological basis and dense personal connections. Bill of Rights alliances that extended beyond the progressive community were miscible in this sense. Citizens at different ends of the political spectrum saw the Patriot Act and Bush’s war on terror through different lenses, from outrage over rendition and Guantanamo Bay to ethics of rugged individualism. An organizer in Boise recalled to us:

We did get a lot of calls from the more conservative people in Idaho, who were concerned about their privacy; they were worried about their guns being taken away and were not agreeing with the Patriot Act and wanted more information. . . . It was an interesting first meeting because there was a wide variety of people there and there was a lot on animosity in the room toward each other. Some of the divisive issues were guns and immigration.

The defining identities of potential allies conflicted directly—Dallas BOR supporters included the Stonewall Democrats (a network of gay and lesbian groups), the Eagle Forum (a profamily group formed by Phyllis Schlafly), and fundamentalist Muslims and Christians. Personal relationships linking activists on the left and right were few and far between.

Given their mutual concern over threats to civil liberties, ideologically disparate groups could potentially join forces and indeed had a strong incentive to do so. But collaboration across movement communities was labored. In contrast to the easy informality of alliances between Greens, peace activists, and advocates of human rights, coalitions that combined gays, lesbians, and fundamentalists required ground rules. The Dallas BORDC organizer recalled, “We made only factual arguments; we made sure that people knew we had no ideological agenda, and that we were open to all and we treat all groups with respect.” Shared principles had to be identified and personal relationships forged:

So, ultimately, we just used a process of extremely time-consuming relationship building, and consensus building, and coming to an understanding of shared values, common values that we can agree on, even though we would explicitly say, “We are going to vehemently disagree on other issues.”

Weakly miscible groups devote great effort to build connections that strongly miscible groups begin with. Coalition formation is slow, and good-faith efforts easily derailed. Much depends on the political skills and network position of key players: one coalition was described as benefiting from the organizer’s “schizophrenic background” in the business com-
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munity and the human rights community. Missed opportunities and failure to form a working alliance are common.

We thus turn to situational factors that facilitate the growth of broad-based coalitions. These are of limited significance where ideologically and relationally close groups are concerned; indeed, we might better consider what forces would keep strongly miscible groups apart. By contrast, the chance that weakly miscible groups will self-assemble are not high and depend on favorable circumstances. The BOR campaign suggests the significance of three sets of factors: the social movement’s interpretive frame, its internal organization and tactics, and the political opportunity structure it faced.

Social movement frames help build broad coalitions when they attract a wide variety of groups to a cause, provide a discursive context in which different visions appear complementary, and offer a logic that assists disparate groups in finding common ground. All three mechanisms appear in the case of the BOR campaign, which was motivated as an effort to protect the core principles that underlie American democracy. Its literal beneficiary was not a particular group or interest but a sacred text. In Idaho and elsewhere, groups called themselves “Patriots.”

The BORDC’s interpretive frame spoke to a wide variety of potential adherents, most notably principled idealists on the political right and left. A movement centering on the injustices experienced by Muslims and Arab Americans or on the threat to a specific right guaranteed by the Constitution would have enrolled a narrower constituency. Understandings of the principles underlying a free society were complex enough that proponents could speak with different voices and flexible enough that varied interpretations could be seen as reinforcing rather than conflicting. The Dallas organizer recalled, for example:

The president of the local League of Women Voters was perhaps the strongest supporter we had. She spoke in passionate, eloquent terms before the city council—it was incredible, the power of her saying, “These are American values; I am a descendent of the Mayflower, my relatives and I are members of the Daughters of the American Revolution, we can’t have this [attack on civil liberties].” . . . We’ve also had a couple of rabbis go speak to the city council—having them speak to the city council, invoking the values of Jewish solidarity and making room for the stranger in our community, not discriminating against immigrants just because of their national origin or skin color—these were powerful messages.

The campaign’s frame also provided discursive materials that supporters could employ internally to work out their differences. According to the Dallas organizer, “We said, ‘There are many things you can disagree on,
but not the infrastructure on which our freedoms are based. These are core values that transcend our petty ideological differences.”

The decentralized structure and tactics of the campaign also promoted broad-based coalitions. The BORDC was an informational clearinghouse rather than a command and control center. Its message was thus heard by many groups that were socially and ideologically distant from progressives in Northampton, Massachusetts. The Web provided an ideal communicative tool—disseminating BORDC-broadcast critiques of the Patriot Act, accounts of prior resolutions, and links to other interested groups—and provided further support when local groups sought it out. Talanian described the campaign’s paucity of resources:

I was working on my own computer; I had Internet access but I had no funding—everything I did was on the Internet—I had to rely on my e-mail account. People would write to me and I would get back to them mostly via e-mail, hardly ever by the phone. Now that we have a few staff, our two organizers are in contact with people in their east and west regions by phone, but we don’t have a big budget, we don’t do travel.

A more traditionally organized campaign orchestrated from the top, by contrast, would have depended on personal and organizational ties that restrict the scope of mobilizing efforts. The impersonal structure of the Web tended to defeat pressures toward homophily that arise quickly in networks and organizations.

The tactic of municipal resolutions promoted heterogeneity by permitting groups within each city to mobilize autonomously and in their own way. Each of the four mobilizing efforts we examined has a different character. The New York coalition drew on a vibrant activist network; Columbia combined the associational infrastructure of a college town with groups like the NAACP; Dallas gained the support of elites within the business community and traditional conservative groups; and the Boise Patriots brought together members of groups as disparate as the NRA and the Greens. Because coalitions grew out of their cities’ political culture, great diversity appears across municipalities as well as within them. A national campaign organized from the top would have been less responsive to local opportunities and constraints.

Furthermore, the fact that each city crafted its own stance on civil liberties enhanced the capacity of different types of coalitions to form and be effective. Some municipalities took tough stands—most notably, eight passed ordinances that carried the weight of law by instructing city officials to refuse to comply with unconstitutional components of the Patriot Act. (Even stronger measures were taken in Brattleboro, Vt., and a few other places, where law-enforcement officials were directed to arrest President Bush if he was to enter the municipality.) At the opposite end of
the scale, some cities offered the mildest of resolutions—for example, North Adams, Massachusetts, enjoined its citizenry to “reflect on the values and liberties protected by the Bill of Rights.” While most resolutions followed a fairly standard script between these extremes, the fact that coalitions could seek and be satisfied by resolutions that fit their politics expanded the diversity and scope of the campaign.

A final set of factors that promoted broad coalitions, we would argue, has to do with the political opportunity structure faced by the BORDC. One was the dearth of alternative mobilizing venues. As Talanian pointed out, “If 98 senators vote in favor of a bill, they’re not going to say, oops, we made a mistake. We had to work in a different way, educate the community and get community support.” By the same token, groups that opposed the Patriot Act had little option but to operate at the municipal level and thus to work together. As alternative political avenues began to open up, broad municipal coalitions could break up as activists began to pursue electoral politics or sought to influence Congress. Ironically, a lack of political opportunity at the national level promoted miscibility at the local level.

Second, the absence of state repression helped activists recruit and maintain broad-based coalitions. Repression generally thins the ranks of protesters, driving out moderates and sympathizers while contributing to the radicalization of those who remain. Groups mobilized under the BOR banner did not face strong-arm police tactics and were opposed as misguided idealists rather than as dissidents. Some municipal authorities suggested that BOR resolutions might generate a backlash (in the form of a loss of federal funds or a legally precarious position for city officials), but these concerns were hypothetical and did not personally threaten BOR supporters.

Third, and perhaps most important, broad coalitions formed a winning strategy. This was well understood by leaders like Talanian, who argued that the campaign should be nonpartisan. It was also understood by activists on the ground, particularly those operating in conservative locales. Leaders of the BORDC self-consciously sought to build coalitions that would represent wide swaths of the community and that would carry weight with city councils. Groups in cities like Dallas actively sought allies in the moneyed and business communities and made concerted efforts to bring the Libertarian Party on board. Narrow coalitions, by contrast, were less likely to achieve their objectives. As the Boise organizer told us:

I’ve heard about one or two communities that were not very successful—
I think the reasons for their failure were because they didn’t do a very
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good job of being neutral. They were holding meetings but they weren’t inviting people most unlike them.

An overarching lesson of the BORDC case is that the breadth of movement coalitions is not explained by a single factor and, in particular, is not reducible to characteristics of the groups involved or the issue they mobilize around. The challenge of linking weakly miscible groups differs from that of bringing strongly miscible groups together and requires considerably more expertise on the part of movement activists. A campaign’s organization and tactics affect its capacity to build alliances across the social and political spectrum, as does the political opportunity structure it faces.

Multiple lines of inquiry appear fruitful in testing and extending the analysis of miscibility developed inductively here. There is much room to contrast campaigns that address the same issue with different tactics and different issues with the same tactics. And while there has been careful analysis of intermovement dynamics involving cycles of protest and spillover effects (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Tarrow 1994), less attention has been paid to coalitional dynamics. These are important because there is great diversity across movements in their capacity to respond to legitimacy gains and an expanding network of potential coalition partners. Recent environmentalist efforts to address climate change, for example, have involved the construction of ties to labor (such as the Blue-Green Alliance led by the United Steelworkers and the Sierra Club) and a variety of religious groups including leading evangelicals. In the case of student antiwar protest in the 1960s, by contrast, internal radicalization led the student movement to remain marginal and unpopular even as opposition to the Vietnam War gained mainstream support.

Attention to miscible mobilization also contributes to the civil society debate. We join much recent scholarship that focuses on change in the form rather than the amount of civic engagement and contends that while traditional civic associations are on the decline, movement-based forms of collective action are on the rise. This is a core message of Sampson et al.’s (2005) analysis of public events and is well captured by Meyer and Tarrow’s (1998) notion of a “social movement society.” Meyer and Tarrow (1998, p. 18) propose, for example, that activists are increasingly able to “assemble coalitions out of local and translocal groups and to mount collective action after relatively brief preparation in a variety of venues” and that social capital “may be growing in the capacity of citizens to put together temporary coalitions for contentious politics.” A movement society perspective fits the BOR campaign to a tee; we would add that coalitions must link groups across the social and political spectrum if they are to contribute to consensus politics as well as contentious politics.

PROOF 40
SO WHAT?
This article has dwelled on conditions linked to the passage of BOR resolutions while saying little about the campaign’s possible significance. In this concluding section, we review—in appropriately tentative fashion—the possible impact of municipal resolutions in support of civil liberties.

In an immediate legal sense, BOR resolutions carry little weight. The Constitution’s supremacy clause declares the laws of the United States the supreme law of the land. Federal law preempts state law and local ordinances rather than the other way around. Arguably, municipal resolutions give some legal cover to local authorities who do not wish to partner with federal agencies in the war on terror—but not much.

In broader legal terms, the BOR campaign means a bit more. While the U.S. Supreme Court provides the ultimate interpretation of constitutional protections, many voices contribute to an evolving debate over the proper uses of and limits to government power. Given the currently beleaguered position of the progressive legal tradition in the federal judiciary, in fact, there is considerable demand for new forums within which opposition to dominant legal philosophies can evolve. It is in this context that legal scholar David Cole (2004, p. 125) describes municipal BOR resolutions as “an example of popular constitutionalism outside the courts at its very best.”

The BOR movement is more important as a political phenomenon. Grassroots mobilization around any issue sends a message to the people’s representatives, and some 400 resolutions representing over 80 million citizens provide a clear signal. And while the U.S. Congress has shown little appetite for challenging the Bush administration on human rights, the trend is toward slowly growing opposition. “Patriot 2” was dead on arrival, and reauthorization of Patriot 1 faced stalwart though unsuccessful opposition. The likely trajectory of the internal and external war on terror remains in doubt, but the BOR campaign is surely a politically significant component of the response to the response to 9/11.

Activists take the long view, perhaps in part because the shorter view remains discouraging. From their perspective, BOR resolutions are most important for the educational and coalition-building work that they occasion. One potential achievement lies in building ties that survive the mobilization effort and that narrow the distance between groups that we have described as weakly miscible. A Dallas activist was guardedly optimistic:

We did do some good, I think, in terms of establishing relationships that endure to this day between different faiths and groups. With the Muslim and gay groups, for example, we made progress. The Muslim groups that
initially objected so strongly learned to work with and even like these people, and I think some of these relationships continue to this day. Same thing with the relationships between some Jewish and Muslim groups. I wouldn’t overstate this, but without a doubt relationships are better and have continued after the BOR campaign.

But others saw less change:

On an individual level, a few people have told me that being involved in the Boise Patriots made them think about things differently, be more open to who they talk to, to who they form a coalition with. But I saw the whole thing disintegrate after we accomplished our goals. Everybody went back to their original petty squabbling.

Most directly, municipal resolutions provided citizens and local authorities with an education in the politics of civil liberties. They gave groups who opposed the Bush administration’s policies an opportunity to act when they had little leverage in Washington. As the political winds have begun to shift in their favor, activists have sought to build on municipal successes to seek out bigger prey—state houses and, after the 2006 elections, the U.S. Congress. Talanian, the founding director of BORDC, makes the case for the campaign’s long-term benefits:

The more communities pass resolutions, [the more it] will help change laws and make people more aware of what their rights are and the importance of protecting them in the future, so that a Patriot Act in a few years couldn’t be passed quietly without being read.29

Tocqueville might agree. For the French nobleman and social theorist, democracy was not the automatic product of laws and elections—indeed, Democracy in America was written in part to persuade his compatriots that liberty required a facility for self-government and political contestation that grows only with practice. In Tocqueville’s elegant language (2000, p. 239), “There is nothing more prolific in marvels than the art of being free; but there is nothing harder than the apprenticeship of freedom.”

APPENDIX

New York BORDC Coalition
Absurd Response
Action Coalition of Staten Island
ACT UP/New York
All Souls Peace Task Force
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
Amnesty International USA
Anti-War Action Group
Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund
Association of Legal Aid Attorneys UAW Local 2325
Astorians for Peace and Justice
Bronx Greens
Brooklyn Bridges
Brooklyn Greens
Brooklyn Mental Hygiene Court Monitoring Project
Brooklyn Parents for Peace
Brooklyn Pro-Choice Network
Brooklyn-Queens NOW
The Brooklyn Society for Ethical Culture
The Center for Anti-Violence Education
Center for Constitutional Rights
Central Brooklyn Independent Democrats
Church Ladies for Choice
City Project
Coalition for a District Alternative
Code Pink—New York City
Committees of Correspondence for Democracy and Socialism
Community Church of New York
The Community Civil Rights Advocates USA
Convent Avenue Baptist Church
Council of Pakistan Organization
Council on American-Islamic Relations
Democrats.com
Disabled in Action
Doctors for Global Health
Ethical Culture Society of Queens
Fifth Avenue Committee, Inc.
Flatbush Peace Action
The Foundry Theatre
Freedom Now
Greater New York Labor-Religion Coalition
Green Party USA
Islamic Circle of North America
Jews Against the Occupation
Jews for Racial and Economic Justice
Judson Memorial Church
Justice for Detainees
Kings County Green Party
The Loyal Nine
Manhattan Libertarian Party
Metropolitan Council on Housing
Middle East Natives Testing, Orientation and Referral Services
Mobilize New York
Mouths Wide Open
NAACP
National Association of Korean Americans—N.Y. Chapter
National Coalition Against Censorship
National Coalition to Repeal the Patriot Act
National Lawyers Guild
Network of Arab American Professionals
New Immigrant Community Empowerment
American Journal of Sociology

New Jersey Civil Rights Defense Committee
New York City Labor Against the War
New York Civil Liberties Union
New Yorkers Say No to War
New York Immigration Coalition
New York Microbicides Working Group
New York Public Library Guild, Local 1930, DC 37
New York Youth Bloc
Not In Our Name
NYC AIDS Housing Network
N.Y. Democratic Socialists of America
Older Women’s League, Brooklyn Chapter
Panafrican Cultural Communications
Park Slope Greens
Park Slope United Methodist Church
People for the American Way
Prospect Lefferts Voices for Peace
Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund
Queens Society for Humanistic Judaism, Inc.

Reclaim the Streets
Refuse and Resist!
Roundtable of Institutions of People of Color
RU for Peace
Shorefront Interagency Council on the Aging
Solidarity Action for Human Rights
Staten Island Greens
St. Mary’s Episcopal Church
Stonewall Veterans’ Association
Student Social Workers’ Alliance for a Progressive Society
Sunnyside Woodside Peace Veterans for Peace—NYC Chapter
Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Clarence Fitch Chapter
West Queens Greens
Women In Islam, Inc.
The Women of Color Policy Network
Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom
Working Families Party—South Brooklyn Club
Workmen’s Circle/Arbeter Ring

Dallas BORDC Coalition

Alliance for Justice
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee
American Baptist Churches
American Booksellers Association
American Civil Liberties Union
American Immigration Lawyers Association
American Library Association
American-Muslim Alliance

Amnesty International
Animal Connection
Arab-American Institute
AWOL Records
Black Women’s Defense League
Catholic Charities Immigration CS
Center for Democracy
Center for National Security Studies

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Coalition for the Advancement of Civil Rights
College Libertarians at Texas SU Constitution Party
Council on American Islamic Relations
Dallas DK Corporation
Dallas Libertarian Post
Dallas Peace Center
Democratic Party of Dallas County
Dolphin Blue
Episcopal Church of the Transfiguration
Evangelical Lutheran Church
Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting
First Amendment Foundation
Freedom and Justice Foundation
Friends Committee
Green Party
Hotel Employees Union
House the Homeless
Institute for Policy Innovations
Institute for Policy Studies
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
International Longshore Union
Jewish Council on Urban Affairs
Jews for Peace in Palestine
League of United Latin American Citizens
League of Women Voters
Libertarian Party of Dallas County
Lutheran Office
Mennonite Central Committee
MLK PN Committee
Muslim American Society
Muslim Legal Fund
Muslim Legal Fund of America
NAACP
National Coalition to Protect Political Freedom
National Lawyers Guild
North Texas for Justice and Peace Pax Christi Dallas
Pearson Communications
People for the American Way
Presbyterian Church USA
Progressive Challenge Project
Public Citizen
The Queenie Foundation
Republican Liberty Caucus
Ruffkat Technologies
Southern Christian Leadership Conference
Texas Civil Rights Project
Texas Stonewall Democratic Caucus UN Association
Unitarian Universalist Association
United Church of Christ
United Electrical Union
United for Peace and Justice
United Methodist Church
United Organizations for Justice
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

Columbia, South Carolina, BORDC Coalition

AFL-CIO of S.C.
Antiquarian Book Dealers
Carolina Peace Resource Center
Charleston Peace
Columbia Critical Mass
Columbia Meeting of Quakers
Council on American-Islamic Relations
Episcopal Peace
Gay and Lesbian Pride

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Grimke Sisters  S.C. Green Party
Hilton Head for Peace  S.C. Hispanic Coalition
Islamic Center of Colombia  S.C. Progressive Network
League of Women Voters  S.C. Returned PCV
Midlands Green Party  South Carolina ACLU
Midlands NORML  Thinking People of Charleston
NAACP of South Carolina  UCS Students Allied for Greener Earth
Planned Parenthood  S.C. Progressive Network
S.C. Coalition to Abolish Death  Unitarian Universalist Fellowship
Penalty  United Citizens Party
S.C. Fair Share  S.C. Food Not Bombs

REFERENCES

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