FROM DEPENDENCY TO SOVEREIGNTY:
AN EVENT HISTORY ANALYSIS OF DECOLONIZATION 1870-1987

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This paper examines the precursors of decolonization among Western dependencies from 1870 to 1987 within an event history framework. It focuses on the implications of world economy and world politics perspectives. Results indicate the usefulness of both perspectives, while also pointing to an array of other factors. On the world economy side, the rate of decolonization rose during the period of American hegemony. On the world politics side, decolonization was more rapid where suffrage regimes were broad and after 1960 when imperialism was legislated to global political discourse. There is further evidence of diffusion processes within empires, where the number of prior decolonization events within the empire accelerated the decolonization rate of remaining dependencies. Separate analyses of decolonization before and after World War II point to some shifts in parameters over time that challenge assumptions that institutional effects are invariably located in the later stages of a historical process.

The breakdown of Western empires and the entry of non-Western states into the international system is one of the most massive political processes of the twentieth century. By the criteria employed in this study, 130 colonial dependencies of Western states became recognized independent states or were fully incorporated as parts of sovereign states during the twentieth century. By 1987, the remnants of once far-flung colonial empires constituted a tiny portion of the world's population and land area.

A number of recent studies have quantitatively analyzed long-term patterns in Western colonialization (Bergesen and Schenker 1980, McGoogan 1985, Buswell 1989). These studies have advanced our understanding of the expansion of the Western political and economic system, indicating links between colonial activity and properties of the system as a whole. They present evidence that the aggregate number of formal dependencies is inversely related to hegemony in the interstate system and economic upheavals in the world economy.

These analyses of "net colonization" treat the result of the twin processes of colonization and decolonization. It may be fruitful, however, to also consider these processes in isolation to keep distinct the question "under what conditions do Western states construct formal dependencies?" and "under what conditions do formal dependencies move to sovereign status?" This separation is particularly important in pursuing the latter issue, which leads to be theoretically defocused.

Why attend to decolonization? From the perspective of theories of the world-system, decolonization is important because state sovereignty potentially changes the economic and political "rules of the game." Sovereign states have widely legitimated rights to nationalize industries (Krasner 1978), spur economic growth through central direction and initiative (Delantre and Rabin 1981, Evans 1985), and organize collectively (Krasner 1985). A world-system composed of sovereign states may be quite unlike one made up of empires.

In this paper I address the historical phenomenon of decolonization by connecting patterns in its timing to general theoretical arguments. I turn first to two analyses of the world-system: "world economy" arguments focusing on core-periphery exchange and "world policy" arguments focusing on the global diffusion and institutionalization of political models.
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DATA AND MEASURES
Definitions and The Scope of the Study
Dependency is defined in this paper as a relation of explicit political subordination. Operationally, dependency is formed through the creation of a colonial administration or protectorate (where sovereignty over internal jurisdiction or external freedom of action are ceded). This definition includes a number of cases not always treated as formal dependencies; for instance, U.S. imposition of budgetary controls and of military occupation are regarded as transforming several Caribbean polities into American protectorates in the early twentieth century. It does not include unequal treaties opening areas to economic penetration or giving one Western state special economic privileges.

Decolonization occurs when a dependency becomes a new sovereign state or when it is fully incorporated into an existing sovereign state. In the second case the existing state may be the prior metropolis (as with Hawaii and the U.S.) or some other polity (as with Goa and India). Decolonization must be recognizable fact within the Western international community. Recognition by the previous sovereign is the effective criterion unless, as in the case of South African homelands or Portuguese colonies, metropolitan definitions are widely and explicitly challenged in the international community.

This study examines the colonial dependencies of Western states, where "Western states" include the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, and ex-settler colonies such as the United States. Dependencies of non-Western states are excluded from the analysis. Also excluded are geographically proximate dependencies of Western states. For example, neither the component parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire nor the British and American dependencies of the United States is included in the data set.

The definition of the population takes both theoretical and pragmatic considerations into account. Theoretically, the aim is to make sense of the concrete historical phenomena of the breakup of the colonial system; in practice, the dependencies are a source of national prestige and pride, and that decolonization may therefore stem from the inability of the metropolitan state to crush rebellion. This argument, and other factors less clearly connected to a particular theoretical logic, are empirically assessed below.

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society in the nineteenth century and after 1945, and changes in metropolitan military power and political institutions occurring over the course of a century. In addition, 1897 marks the emergence of the intense military and economic competition characteristic of the nineteenth century, as the Franco-Prussian War restructured the balance of power in Europe and Britain's industrial dominance was challenged by Germany. I would thus argue that the latter part of the eighteenth century thus does not involve such a fundamentally different international context that comparisons become more misleading than helpful (as a comparison to eighteenth century decolonization in the Americas might). To test this assumption, models were also estimated over the periods 1918-1977 and 1974-1987 (the latter conditions on the first decolonization event); results were almost identical to those discussed below.

This study in 1976 captures as much of the process of twentieth century decolonization as is possible. It is often contended that more recent decolonization is geographically uninteresting or not comparable to earlier events. For example, Bowser (1989) suggests in his analysis in 1960, arguing that the emergence of global norms demanding imperialism changed the meaning of decolonization and secession. I would instead regard the shifts in the legitimacy of imperial arrangements as factors to be included in the analysis of decolonization. More generally, the spread of decolonization from major colonies like India and Indonesia and dependencies all over the world (Africa, the Caribbean) is a theoretically interesting aspect of the process that should be explained, not assumed to be unimportant or disjoint from earlier events.

Within the definitions discussed above, I attempt to cover all non-Western dependencies of Western states in existence over the 1870-1987 period. Herring's (1970) comprehensive listing of colonial governments from 1415 to 1969 was used to establish the founding and decolonization dates of most non-Western dependencies. Banks (1987) was used to cover the period from 1970 to 1987. Descriptive research on secondary materials mentioned and supplemented these data to fill the periods discussed above. Decolonization dates were measured to the year; decolonization dates to the day and month where available.

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS

Figure 1 displays an integrated hazard plot (Aden 1975) of the transition rate from dependency to sovereignty from 1870 to 1987. The slope of the integrated hazard gives a proportional estimate of the rate of decolonization as a function of time. An upward (downward) acceleration of the curve indicates that the rate of decolonization rises (declines) over time. Ninety-five percent confidence intervals are marked by dashed lines.

The plot shows clearly that the transition rate from dependency to sovereign status increased dramatically over historical time. One can see that the slope of the curve increases from 1924, the year of the first decolonization event in the twentieth century, until almost the end of the observation period. By contrast, I show elsewhere (Aden, forthcoming) that the rate of decolonization does not vary with dependency age. Together, these results suggest that decolonization is primarily conditioned by factors external to the dependency.

Both world systems perspectives can explain the rapid increase in the rate of decolonization over historical time. From a world systems viewpoint, much may be attributed to American hegemony and global economic expansion after World War II. World political arguments point to the increasing dominance of the expanded nation-state model and the dynamics of diffusion. In addition, realist attention to the declining military stature of the major colonial powers lends a third plausible explanation of the historical trend. A central concern of the analysis below is to identify the rate of increase of decolonization to specific factors at the dependency, metropolitan, and systemic levels.

Independent Variables

Measure-capturing both the arguments discussed above and a number of other factors were constructed from publicly available data sets and statistical yearbooks. All variables were measured continuously or repeatedly at intervals of a decade or less, as a rule, to capture temporal variation within cases. Values are assumed constant between observations.

The world-systems literature provides broad exceptions to the historical hegemony and long waves for the period under study in this paper. Wallerstein (1983) defines hegemony as the presence of a state that is dominant in manufacturing, commerce, finance, and ideas through stages of hegemonic dominance: the Netherlands 1625-1672, Great Britain 1815-1983, and the United States 1945-1967. While there is some controversy over the identification and pe...
pency levels. At the systemic level, the shift in global political discourse from support of coloniz
of early hegemonies, there is little de
cerning the 1870-1967 period. The binary
variable "Hegemony" equals one during the pe-
periods identified by Wallerstein, and zero other-
ge. Goldstein's (1985) periodization of Krada-
waves is used to define upswings and down-
ing in the global economy. For the 1870-
period, Goldstein identifies downswings for 1872-1893 and 1917-1940 and downswings from 188-1872, 1893-1917, and 1940-1967 (and by
the cyclic logic 1967 to 1987 is dated as a down-
swing). "Economic Upswing" is a binary variable corresponding to this periodization. Factors capturing world polity arguments are measured at the systemic, metropo-

dy.

1 I would argue that variables representing implica-
tions of world systems arguments need not be systemic.

2 In recent work Goldstein (1988) revised his posi-
tion, arguing that the post-World War II upswing
bars until 1989. There seems to be less agreement
with this stance than with his original periodization. I
am indebted to Terry Boswell for help with the long
waves literature.

3 This variable was coded by the author from de-
scriptions of colonial institutions in volumes of the
Statesman's Yearbook, Cook and Tuton (1979), and
other secondary sources.

4 In terms of one or the other of these catego-
ries, or through their intersection. Regionally
shaped diffusion suggests imitation and mutual
Support among historically and culturally linked
dependencies. While imperial diffusion within empires may also work through imitation, a
number of other mechanisms may be involved —
for example, shifts in metropolitan policy af-
ter the loss of key dependencies. Therefore, evi-
dence of regional diffusion is required to unambigu-
souls support world polity arguments.

Two variables are constructed to examine these
diffusion processes. "Regional Diffusion" counts the
number of prior decolonization events within the
region. Six regions were defined — the
Americas, the Arctic, North Africa and the Mid-
ner East, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the Pa-
e. While these categories imply a few unlikely
linkages, for the most part they index historically
and culturally connected groups of dependen-
cies. "Imperial Diffusion" counts the number of
prior decolonization events within the empire.
(Both cases, the number of prior events refers to
the number of dependencies moving to sover-
ignty."

The realist perspective (Morgenthau 1978, Waltz 1979) provides an important alternative to world systems approaches to decolonization. The fundamental realist argument is that the formal
anarchy of the international system makes the
state's survival contingent on military capacity
and the will to use it. The annexation and mainte-
Finally, metropolitan settlement may be importantly related to decolonization, though the direction of the relationship seems unclear. Settlers may spur the dependency's development along Western lines and claim sovereignty as their birthright. On the other hand, settlers may seek to preserve the imperial structure that gives them a privileged position within the dependency. This seems especially likely if the settler population, while substantial, is outnumbered by the indigenous population.

To get at these possible relationships, two binary variables were constructed. "Settler Majority" equals one when more than half of the dependency's population are of European ancestry and "Settler Minority" equals one when more than five percent, but less than half, of the dependency's population is of European ancestry. The omitted category is the case where settlers form less than five percent of the total population. Statistics on metropolitan settlement were taken from the Statesman's Yearbook, supplemented by Barrett (1982).

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these explanatory variables. Dependency "Population" and "Trade" are logged to correct for skewness in absolute values. The table indicates that 11% of missing cases for several dependency characteristics. Considering the full set of variables, there is no data on one or more of the dependency-level variables at the moment of 20 of the 130 transitions to sovereignty, and 30% of all observed durations in dependent status. However, descriptive statistics for the cases without missing values do not differ greatly from the full set of cases. Furthermore, parameter estimates and significance levels are largely the same for all models reported when dependency trade and metropolitan settlement, the chief sources of missing cases, are omitted from the analysis. None of the central conclusions of the paper would change if those analyses were reported.

MODELLING FRAMEWORK

Event history analysis provides an appropriate methodology for the study of decolonization, indices from the Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times to 1970 and the Statistical Abstract of the United States 1987 to control for inflation, and standardized by dependency population. Note that the measures captures the importance of foreign trade in dependency. It would be desirable to also measure the economic importance of the dependency to the metropolis, but I was unable to find a way to do so.

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which involves a discrete change (movement from formal dependency to formal sovereignty) that may occur at any point in time. The quantity of interest is the instantaneous transition rate:

\[ r(t) = \lim_{\Delta t \to 0} \frac{P(t, t + \Delta t)}{\Delta t} \]  

(1)

Event history methods allow regression-like analyses of the conditions that raise or lower the transition rate (see Tuma and Hanlon 1984).

As discussed above, Figure 1 indicates that the rate of decolonization accelerates rapidly with historical time over the period studied. The explanatory challenge is in large part to account for this massive twentieth-century rise in the rate of decolonization. At the same time, it is important to control for unobserved temporal effects to recover unbiased estimates of the effects of measured variables. Given the historical trend indicated in Figure 1, a Gompertz model provides a convenient framework for analysis. This allows the rate to vary as an exponential function of covariates and historical time:

\[ r(t) = \exp(\beta x + \gamma) \]  

(2)

In addition, analyses were also performed using Cox's partial likelihood technique, which provides a more general way to control for unobserved temporal variability. Results proved equivalent to those for Gompertz models shown below.

In the models below, coefficients may be interpreted as the multiplier or fractional change in the rate for an infinitesimal change in the covariate. Likelihood ratio tests compare the model to the baseline of a simple Gompertz model including a constant and an effect of historical time. Large values signal significant improvement in fit; test statistics are distributed as $\chi^2$ with degrees of freedom equal to the number of covariates. Models are estimated by iterative maximum likelihood procedures using RATE (Tuma 1980).

RESULTS

Decolonization 1870-1987

Table 2 presents results for a Gompertz model of the transition rate from dependency to sovereignty between 1870 and 1987. Consistent with Bown's (1989) findings, hegemony increases the rate of decolonization significantly. The period of global hegemony between 1945 and 1967 has a rate of decolonization almost four times larger than periods of parity among core states. A world economy interpretation points to the exportation of competition over peripheral markets in the post-World War II era, as European powers focused on domestic concerns while the United States orchestrated a global free market regime. By contrast, no support is found for other major world economy prediction, that periods of global economic expansion produce a lowering of political ties between core and periphery. One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>p-value</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hegemony</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic uprising</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN declaration</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical time</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>&gt;.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metropolitan</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>&gt;.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval power</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>&lt;.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suffrage</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>&lt;.05</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. ML Estimates of Transition Rates from Dependent to Sovereign States 1870-1987

Table 3 presents results for a Gompertz model of the transition rate from dependency to sovereignty between 1870 and 1987. Consistent with Bown's (1989) findings, hegemony increases the rate of decolonization significantly. The period of global hegemony between 1945 and 1967 has a rate of decolonization almost four times larger than periods of parity among core states. A world economy interpretation points to the exportation of competition over peripheral markets in the post-World War II era, as European powers focused on domestic concerns while the United States orchestrated a global free market regime. By contrast, no support is found for other major world economy prediction, that periods of global economic expansion produce a lowering of political ties between core and periphery. One

For binary variables it is convenient to interpret exp(\beta) as the amount the rate is multiplied by when x equals 1 rather than 0. For hegemony, exp(1.12) = 3.70.
reason may be the perfect overlap with periods of hegemony after 1945; when hegemony is omitted from the model, economic upswings have a significant positive effect. On the other hand, a global economic boom occurred during the 1920s and 1930s, a period of metropolization, and in the 1950s and 1960s, when decolonization was launched during the economic stagnation of the interwar period. While one might argue that rapid decolonization in the decades after World War II was accelerated by global economic growth, economic fluctuations are not generally synchronized to decolonization.

World polity arguments are generally supported. At the systemic level, the delegitimation of imperialism formalized by the United Nations’ 1945 declaration seems to have substantially raised the rate of decolonization. Net of other factors, the estimated rate of decolonization after the UN Declaration in 1945 is nearly six times larger than before. While a number of explanations for systemic effects can be suggested, I would argue that the crucial change occurring around 1945 was a shift in the terms of international political discourse. Explicit opposition to decolonization in overseas territories was delegitimized, as the debate in the United Nations and Portuguese Africa made clear (Nogueira 1963).

The impact of the nation-state model shows up strongly at the metropolitan level. Broad metropolitan suffrage regimes substantially raise the rate of decolonization in the metropole’s dependencies. The addition of a third of the population to the metropolitan electorate (a typical increment when universal male suffrage is achieved, or when universal suffrage replaces universal male suffrage) quintuples the estimated rate (exp[2.86 x 3] = 4.97). The estimated effect of self-governing institutions in the dependency is also positive, but falls short of a statistically significant significance at the .05 level.

There is evidence for the diffusion of decolonization within empires, but little within regions. To give some notion of the scale of these effects, “Imperial Diffusion” multiplies the rate of decolonization for British dependencies by 1.16 in 1945 (15 British dependencies, 1.56 in 1955 (15 events), 2.77 in 1965 (34 events), and 3.63 in 1970 (34 events). There are a variety of processes that might produce diffusion within empires: imitation and signaling between dependencies, the institutionalization of metropolitan routines, or the political objectives of metropolitan factors. Lacking a successful theory to account for the diffusion of decolonization within empires, the results are available in terms of the relationship between dependencies. Simple imitation seems untenable as the fundamental mechanism involved, however, since one would then expect a larger regional effect.

Realist arguments stressing metropolitan military strength point to an important obstacle to decolonization. As expected, dependencies of militarily strong metropoles tend to remain in dependent status. American retention of a number of dependencies (such as Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands) provides important evidence for this relationship, especially since by world polity arguments the United States should witness very rapid decolonization.

The size of the dependency’s population accelerates decolonization markedly. Some of the most consequential early events are the independence of the Philippines, India, and Indonesia. The last decolonization events, on the other hand, involve dependencies such as Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis, and Brunel. Hong Kong is the most populous territory remaining in dependent status in 1987.

High volumes of trade (per capita) have an insignificant negative effect on decolonization. Other analyses substituting exports per capita for total trade per capita also yielded similar results. These findings contrast the expectations that economic development and integration into global markets pave the way for decolonization by producing new groups who can fight for independence. In fact, territories that play a highly specialized role in the world economy (such as Hong Kong or Macao) are strongly tied to the metropolitan economy (i.e., Puerto Rico) seem to be among the fastest to decolonize.

Table 2 indicates that dependencies whose populations are dominated by metropolitan settlers become sovereign about four times more rapidly than dependencies with insignificant settler populations. The most notable examples are the British Dominions, which achieved formal independence in the 1930s and 1940s. Dependences with substantial settler minorities are neither faster nor slower to gain sovereignty than dependencies with very few settlers. This may be due to countervailing effects: settlers are carriers of metropolitan rights, but are also more loyal to the King where imperial policy is concerned.

Finally, a remarkable result is that historical time has a small and statistically insignificant effect once the above covariates are included in the model. In addition, results for exponential and Cox models (noted for brevity) are equivalent in terms of parameter direction and levels of significance to the results reported in Table 2. Together these findings signal that cross-sectional and temporal variation in the measured covariates are sufficient to account for the rapid historical rise in the rate of decolonization over the 1870 to 1987 period.

### Early vs Late Decolonization

The speed of social change over the 1870s to 1967 period makes it important to examine the possibility of shifts in parameter values over time. In addition, it is often useful in longitudinal studies to distinguish the factors that trigger a process from the factors involved in its maintenance and expansion. A common finding is that various "realistic," case-specific factors are significant in the early stages of a process, while "institutional," systemic processes dominate the later stages (Tolbert and Zucker 1981; Tolbert 1985).

Since methods designed to systematically detect shifts in parameter values have not been developed in event history analysis, one must choose dates at which to split the observation period. Many considerations suggest World War II as the critical watershed for decolonization. World War II gave rise to American hegemony, shifting political and military power away from the major colonial powers; it was followed by an extended economic boom that contrasts sharply with the pre-war depression; it marked the first time an Asian power (Japan) had successfully reversed Western political expansion; and it promoted political ideas and institutions which supported decolonization.

Table 3 gives parameter estimates for separate analyses from 1870 to 1945 and from 1945 to 1967. Seventeen events occurred in the first period, 113 events in the second. The variables are generally the same as those reported in Table 2: "Hegemony" and "Economic Upswing." Form a simple variable in the post-World War II analysis, since they are perfectly correlated over that period, "UN Declaration" and "Hegemony," are omitted for the 1870-1945 equation since they exhibit no variation or no variation over that period. Only those relationships that differ from the full period analysis are discussed below.

Metropolitan "Naval Capacity" has an insignificant effect on decolonization between 1870 and 1945. The first dependencies to become sovereign were often those of major naval powers like the United States and Great Britain. While other factors help to explain these early independence events, there is little sign that global decolonization was triggered by the displacement of the lesser colonial empires.

On the other hand, metropolitan suffrage has a much larger impact on the rate of decolonization before 1945 than after, though coefficients are significant in both periods. Its strong effect in the earlier period is illustrated by the first decolonization events: American withdrawal of controls over Caribbean protectorates (Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic) and the Soviet Union’s incorporation of imperial Russia’s protectorates (Bukhara, Khiva). In very different ways the United States and the Soviet Union both represent political systems grounded in theories of sovereignty in their respective empires.
of popular sovereignty.

Self-governing institutions in the dependency show the opposite pattern, with insignificant effects before 1945 and quite strong effects after World War II. One reason may be that the dependencies with representative institutions in the early twentieth century often had other characteristics that bolstered independence. For example, the British Dominions were large settler colonies under a metropolitan with a broad suffrage regime. Representative institutions may have had a larger impact after 1945 by providing small, non-settler societies with a vehicle for the legitimate formulation of independence demands.

Dependency "Trade," as insignificant effects in both periods. To further explore the impact of social structural change and economic development, I also added a measure of urbanization (United Nations 1965) to the post-World War II analysis (the measure was only available for the postwar era). Urbanization had a small, insignificant effect, giving greater support to the tentative inference that economic transformation within the dependency has little effect on decolonization.

The impact of metropolitan settlers declines over time. The coefficient for "Settler minority" is two times larger between 1870 and 1945 than after 1945. The coefficient for substantive settler minorities is also very large before 1945, and insignificant afterward. Additional results (not shown) indicate a steady decline in the impact of metropolitan settlement throughout the 1870-1987 period. While beyond are initially large and positive, the impact a settler minority reaches zero in 1939, and that of a settler majority in 1970. After those dates, dependencies with metropolitan settlers are estimated to decolonize at a slower rate than dependencies with a negligible settler presence.

This temporal shift makes sense. In the prewar era, settlers were the carriers of metropolitan ideologies of popular sovereignty. They promoted decolonization to rid themselves of colonial restraints and achieve external sovereignty. But after 1945, indigenous peoples became the heirs of decolonization, and settlers left on colonially maintained their privileged positions. Sizeable settler populations were major obstacles to independence in Algeria and Kenya. When Southern Rhodesia sought to achieve independence as a racist state in 1965, its demands were unrecognized by both Great Britain and the world community as a whole.

Finally, two parameter shifts are intriguing but possibly misleading. "Hegeemony/Upswing" has an insignificant effect in the post-World War II period. It is also insignificant in the unreported analyses of the periods 1918-1945 and 1924-1957. Two interpretations seem possible. One is that shifts in other parameters are mistakenly attributed to hegeemony in the full period (1870-1987) analysis. Alternatively, one may argue that the effect of hegeemony has too long run trends, and can only be detected when a relatively broad time frame is employed. While both interpretations are reasonable, I would choose the second on the strength of much qualitative historical discussion and the fact that the rise in the parameter's standard error is not very large.

The number of prior decolonization events within the empire slows decolonization before 1945 while it speeds decolonization after World War II. This implies that prior decolonization within the empire led metropoles to tighten their hold on their remaining dependencies. Such a relationship seems possible in the inter war era, since decolonization was not yet institutionalized. But I would emphasize that diffusion is supposed to be slow at the outset of a process. The most compelling evidence distinguishing diffusion from a secular trend is the explosion of events in the middle of the process. In fact, it is quite possible for diffusion effects, when estimated net of a historical trend, to appear negative in severely right censored analyses.

DISCUSSION

In this paper I have tried to link empirical patterns in twentieth century decolonization to theoretical understandings of the world system, pointing to sources of decolonization spanning both units of analysis and substantive arguments. Substantial effects are found for dependency characteristics (population and representative institutions), metropolitan effects (naval capacity and suffrage regimes), network effects (diffusion within empires), and systemic effects (hegeemony and shifts in international political discourse). Factors as substantively distinct as the military power and the suffrage regime of the metropolis contribute to an account of decolonization. Separate analyses for the periods 1870-1945 and 1945-1987 suggest further insights into the process of decolonization.

World economy arguments connecting hegemony to patterns of peripheral relations receive some support. This paper provides a more severe test of these ideas than aggregate analyses over the longue durée since a variety of dependency and metropolitan characteristics are included in the analysis, and since the time frame is relatively short. At the same time, a methodological (not a conceptual) weakness of the world economy perspective is highlighted here. Because concepts and measures have been developed with the longue durée in mind, it is difficult to empirically distinguish the effect of hegeemony and global economic cycles over the twentieth century. It is thus unclear whether hegeemony facilitates decolonization, or whether it is the combination of hegeemony and economic upswing that is critical.

To the extent that we can distinguish these factors, however, hegeemony is the crucial ingredient in the modern period. The other major period of global hegeemony, the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century, had concrete implications for Spanish-American independence. Aiming to curb Bourbon power, Great Britain recognized revolutionary Spanish colonies as sovereign states and stood ready to block Spanish efforts at reconquest. By contrast, there are simply too many historical upswings in Kondratieff waves to produce a good match with decolonization, which is historically concentrated in two waves (Bergesen and Schroenberg 1980). Simple models of decolonization over the entire period of Western imperialism (1500-1987) suggest effects of hegeemony but an unexpected negative relation to periods of economic expansion (Strange, forthcoming).

World economy arguments are generally supported. Decolonization is rapid after the United Nations' declaration of self-determination (1960), where metropolitan suffrage regimes are broad, and where the dependency possesses self-governing institutions. (This last effect appears to be confined to the post-World War II period.) However, the finding of imperial but not regional diffusion runs counter to world policy arguments. While the notion of imitation is straightforwardly connected to regionally based diffusion, it is not the most compelling explanation of diffusion within empires. On the other hand, the United Nations' colonial status can be understood as a direct product of prior decolonization, especially since ex-dependencies supplied most of the votes.

Overall, the strongest evidence for a "world policy" interpretation of decolonization is the large increase in membership to the United Nations. This increase is linked to the decolonization process, although the mechanism is not clear. Some have argued that the growth of national states has led to greater participation in international organizations. Others have suggested that the growth of nationalist movements has led to increased representation in international institutions. Still others have proposed that the increase in membership is a reflection of the growing economic interdependence among states. Each of these explanations has its merits, but none is sufficient on its own to explain the growth of membership in the United Nations.

In conclusion, the analysis presented in this paper provides a comprehensive account of the process of decolonization. The findings suggest that both domestic and international factors play a role in the decolonization process. The results also indicate that the process is not solely determined by external forces, but is also influenced by the internal dynamics of the dependency. Finally, the analysis highlights the importance of understanding the historical context in which decolonization occurs, as well as the role of hegeemony and global economic cycles in shaping the process.

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general theme is that decolonization arises from characteristics of the larger political context, while more purely economic factors have a more indirect impact (though for a concept like economic hegemony the distinction may not be useful). Metropolitan political institutions and military power clearly matter, as do the pronouncements of the United Nations. The economic transformation of the former colony and global economic conditions seem less relevant.

This conclusion may appear curious. Since Hobson, imperialism has been understood largely in terms of the interests of metropolitan economic elites and the internal transformation of the dependency. It may thus be fruitful to separate the conditions that produce decolonization from those that produce decolonization. The processes that lead to the breakdown of empires may be inherently different from those that construct them. Or change in the world historical context could make colonization occurring mostly in the nineteenth century and decolonization (in the twentieth) seem driven by different logics. Studying attempting to tease out intrinsic from contextual differences seem important in either integrating the processes of colonization and decolonization or understanding the gap between them.

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Military coups and related problems of political control in Third World countries present a major obstacle to economic and social development. We evaluate a synthetic theory of military coups derived from political development theory, military centripetal arguments, several theories of ethnic antagonism, and economic dependency theory. Using data on military interventions in 33 Black African states between 1957 and 1984, we carry out a LISREL analysis of the structural properties for military coups. We find strong support for modernization and competition theories of ethnic antagonism, military centrality theory, and aspects of dependency theory. Political development theory is not supported. Ethnic diversity and competition, military centrality, debt dependence, and political factionalism are major predictors of coup activity. Military centrality is, in turn, rooted in the same underlying structures. Ethnic divergence is a stabilizing force creating social integration and weakening opposition. Intransigent conflicts rooted in ethnic competition and economic dependence appear to create a structural context for military coups and related instabilities.

A n independence, observers hoped that the new states of Black Africa would successfully address the problems of economic and social development within the framework of civilian constitutional regimes and avoid the human costs of military political interventions, e.g., political repression, human rights violations, internal conflicts, and the diversion of scarce economic resources into wars and military build-ups. These hopes have largely been destroyed by pervasive military coups that, military governments, and political instability. Between 1960 and 1982, almost 90 percent of the 45 independent Black African states experienced a military coup, an attempted coup, or a plot (Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984, p. 646). During the course of some 115 legal governmental changes, these states experienced 52 successful coups, 56 attempted coups, and 102 plots, making the military coup “the institutionalized mechanism for succession” in postcolonial Black Africa (Young 1988, p. 57). In the late 1980s, military intervention was state’s chief executive by the regular armed forces or internal security forces through the use (or threat of use). We exclude nonmilitary irregular transfers such as cabinet reshufflings and palace coups that lack military participation. The “new nations” of Black Africa form a region with some of the highest rates of military coups in the world (Zimmermann 1979, pp. 387-91). We are thus able to build on the work of areas experts who have extensively documented pro-

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